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ABSTRACT
Ozone depletion is one of the global environmental 
problems which threaten human health and nature. 
However, what distinguishes ozone depletion from the 
other environmental problems is the fact that a stronger 
and promising international cooperation has been 
established on the issue. It cannot be claimed that this 
cooperation has been a perfect accomplishment from every 
aspect. However, this multinational collaboration can 
constitute an antithesis against the views projecting 
apocalyptic futures. Indeed, the ozone regime can be 
presented as an exemplary case with respect to finding 
solutions for the other global environmental problems. In 
short, it can be stated that the international cooperation 
achieved on the ozone issue may be a hope for further 
environmental collaboration in future.
ÖZET
Ozon delinmesi insan sağlığını ve doğayı tehdit eden 
en önemli global çevre sorunlarından biridir. Ancak ozon 
delinmesini diğer çevre sorunlarından ayıran faktör bu konu 
üzerinde diğerlerine nisbeten daha güçlü ve ilerisi için umut 
vaad edebilen bir uluslararası işbirliğinin sağlanmış 
olmasıdır. Ozonla ilgili işbirliğinin tam anlamıyla mükemmel 
olduğu iddia edilemez, fakat insanlığın ve doğanın geleceği 
için oldukça karamsar tablolar çizen görüşlere karşılık bu 
çok-uluslu dayanışma bir antitez oluşturabilir. Aslında, ozon 
konusu üzerinde kurulmuş olan rejim dünyamızı tehdit eden 
diğer çevre sorunlarına çözüm bulmak için de bir örnek 
teşkil edebilir. Kısacası, ozon delinmesi sonucunda oluşan 
çok-uluslu işbirliğinin belki de gelecekte milletler arasında 
çevre konusunda sağlanabilecek dayanışmanın ilk ışığı ve 
habercisi olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.
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1. Introduction
Having been recognized as major threats against the 
survival of living beings, the deteriorating ecological 
conditions of our planet and their gruesome consequences 
are posed to increasing concern. The seriousness of 
environmental problems has given rise to political actions in 
order to avert catastrophic ends. Indeed, environment has 
appeared as the third major issue in international politics 
along with global security and economics.
The twentieth century has witnessed a great 
industrial and technological development and a rapid 
growth of the world population which in turn brought forth 
the overexploitation of natural resources (See Figures 1 and 
II). In other words, our environment has been condemned 
to intensive stress that is rather impossible to tolerate. 
Consequently, various global environmental problems such 
as ozone depletion, global warming, acid rain 
(trans-boundary air pollution), exploitation of Antarctic 
minerals, destruction of tropical forests, productive land 
desertification, hazardous waste disposal and many others 
have emerged as major issues requiring fundamental 
solutions.
Figure I. Growth of World Population
Billions -
Source ; Population Bulletin 42 (July 1987), Fig 1, p.9.
Figure n. Estimated Gross World Product (in trillions of 
dollars)
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Source: 1960-1980 estimates from CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, 
Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington. D.C.: CIA, 1988), 
p. 22; 1989 estimates from CIA, CIA W orld F a d  Book 
(Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1989), p. 324.
The environmental movement against ecological 
deterioration started in the late 1960s. Prior to this, 
environmental concerns were confined to local problems 
like air or sea pollution. In 1972, the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment was held in 
Stockholm. This conference was a significant event in the 
sense that it symbolized the first multinational legal step, 
and it brought an innovative approach with respect to 
interrelated environmental problems. This Conferences was 
even cited as the beginning of modern international 
environmental law (1). Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration is important since it is concerned with states' 
liability as regards environmental protection:
States have in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the 
sovereign rights of exploiting their own 
resources pursuant to their own 
environm ental polic ies and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of 
other states or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction (2).
Also, the Stockholm Conference caused the creation 
of the United Nations Environment Programme, the only 
United Nations agency involved in a wide range of ecological 
problems. From then on, this organization undertook the 
responsibility for motivating international efforts 
concerning the protection of the environment, and it strove 
for the accomplishment of international environmental 
cooperation.
Evolving scientific research has obviously deepened 
the understanding of environmental problems. More 
importantly, it has become apparent that we live in a fragile 
biosphere where various components of the system should 
work in harmony for the continuation of life. In other 
words, it has been realized that it is man's responsibility to 
respect the interrelatedness of subsystems within the whole 
ecosystem by putting an end to his hazardous activities. 
Such realizations, however, could not bring immediate 
solutions to numerous environmental problems.
Thus. the com plexity of the ecological 
problématique, the anarchic structure of the international 
political system, and the recognition of the limited nature of 
the world’s resources have caused some scholars to argue
that the consequence will be intense international conflict. 
However, international efforts and negotiations have been 
carried out in certain areas that challenge this view to a 
certain extent: ozone depletion is a case in point.
Ozone depletion is one of these major global 
environmental problems that have threatened life on earth 
and it will be analyzed in this thesis as a case study. Indeed, 
the political evolution of the ozone issue has constituted a 
unique example among the other environmental problems 
in the sense that it is the issue which has come closest to 
full international cooperation. The major purpose of this 
study is therefore to explore in what ways the ozone 
depletion problem orientated world states into international 
environmental cooperation. The ultimate conclusion derived 
from this case study will be employed to throw light on the 
question of whether ecological threats can lead to 
international environmental cooperation or conflict.
For this end. the initial step will be to introduce to 
the reader the scientific and historical background of the 
ozone issue within part 2. Then, in order to see the 
dimensions of consensus on the issue, we will resort to 
detailed analysis of the main legal and political
developments and achievements regarding ozone depletion 
in part 3. In part 4, we will discuss whether ecological 
threats are likely to cause conflicts or to promote 
international environmental cooperation. The fifth part will 
be concerned with the type of cooperation achieved on the 
ozone issue. Finally, the conclusion part will be an overview 
of the ideas employed within the study.
2. Scientific and historical perspectives regarding o 
depletion:
Scientific and historical knowledge is the key 
element in comprehending and assessing the grave 
consequences of all kinds of environmental degradation. 
Thus, before analyzing the political perspective and the 
world states approaches as regards the ozone layer 
depletion, it is necessary to summarize the scientific aspect 
of the problem and to list the historical developments from 
the first discovery to the latest agreements on this 
ecological threat.
2.1 The causes of ozone depletion:
What causes the ozone loss that results in an 
inevitable depletion? In point of fact, it is rather sarcastic to 
state that what disturbs the ecological balance and 
endangers human life is a product of the technological 
endeavor and the industrial development on earth: 
man-made chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) gas is responsible for 
the destruction of the thin ozone layer. Unfortunately, the 
premise of many of the prevailing environmental problems 
is the Western-style industrialization model which
aggravates the function and the stability of the world's 
ecosystems (3).
The individual or group self-interest of 
human beings has been the source of 
most environmental problems.. The idea 
of material progress has been equated 
with man's free use of nature, or rather 
separation of man from nature (4).
CFCs were discovered and manufactured during the 
early 1930s (5). They were subjected to scientific tests and 
were claimed to be safe. Unfortunately, the future 
environmental repercussions of these seemingly safe and 
inexpensive compounds, which were promoting the 
technological improvements and enhancing economic 
profit, could not be predicted by anyone. Consequently, a 
giant industry emerged in order to supply more CFC 
products to the covetous consumer mass while at the same 
time it was being enormously nourished by the coming 
profit. The investments and the increments in profit had 
been aggrandized to such an extent that when the perils of 
the CFCs were discovered in the early 1970s, the only 
suitable way for the industry was to refute the scientific 
evidence. Thus, man himself perpetuated the existence of a
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very serious problem which in turn would threaten his own 
life.
As it was mentioned before, CFCs have many 
advantages as chemical compounds. They are stable, 
nontoxic, nonflammable, noncorrosive and inexpensive 
substances; therefore, they are extremely useful in many 
industrial areas (6). CFCs are safe alternatives to ammonia 
gas and other coolants that tend to be explosive and 
dangerous when used in refrigerators, thus they can be 
efficiently used in refrigerators and air conditioners as well 
as in spray containers for cosmetics, household products, 
pharmaceuticals and cleaners (7). As regards plastic-foam 
materials, CFCs are the standard ingredients and can be 
used to fill up the small cells in foam insulation. Finally, they 
are also perfect solvents for cleaning microchips and 
telecommunications equipment (8).
What nullifies the value of all these mentioned 
properties of CFCs is the production of chlorine-a substance 
which is a very efficient catalyzer in the destruction of the 
ozone molecules- as a result of the photodissociation 
process of chlorofluorocarbons in the stratosphere (the 
layer of the atmosphere above the troposhere). In point of 
fact, under normal conditions "there is very little chlorine
in the stratosphere... this gas reacts strongly with almost 
any waterdrop or particle it touches and as a result it is 
used up long before it can diffuse upward" (9). However, 
CFCs are exceptionally enduring molecules and with a long 
journey they can reach the remote parts of the stratosphere 
where ozone concentrations increase sharply. When CFCs 
are exposed to intense solar radiation, they are broken 
down into smaller fragments and release a great amount of 
chlorine to the stratosphere. Then, the chlorine atom 
catalyzes the reaction of ozone with atomic oxygen in which 
ozone is converted into a molecular oxygen and thus 
destroyed (10). However, the chlorine atom remains 
unaffected in this process. Consequently, in addition to its 
contribution to the destruction of an ozone molecule, 
chlorine continues its existence making the same process 
over and over again (11).
Essentially, some amount of ozone in the 
stratosphere is being continually destroyed by natural 
chemical reactions occurring everday. However, there is a 
fragile equilibrium assuring that "ozone is being produced at 
the same rate as it is being destroyed" (1). In other words, 
the amount of ozone in the atmosphere remains constant 
unless a substance like chlorine catalyzes the destruction
10
process and makes it faster than the production. 
Consequently, this results in the decrease of ozone 
molecules in the stratosphere.
F. Sherwood Rowland, who discovered with Mario 
Molina that CFCs eould destroy the ozone in the 
stratosphere, indicates that different CFCs might continue 
to remain in the atmosphere for many decades or several 
centuries according tho their special structures, Rowland 
says that:
Most of the other CFCs have somewhat 
longer lifetimes, up to 140 years, so that 
an appreciable fraction may still remain 
in the atmosphere even after 200 years...
All indications are that the chlorine 
atoms released from CFCs are going to be 
with us for a long time, even if release of 
CFCs is discontinued tomorrow (13).
Thus, since a chlorine atom "could destroy a million 
ozone molecules before some other chemical comes along 
to stop the process," it is apparent that incessant release of 
CFCs to the atmosphere might lead to the annihilation of 
the whole ozone layer sometime in the future (14). In 
addition to CFCs other chemical substances like the halons
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used in the fire extinguishers have also been identified as 
harmful to the ozone layer (15). However, inspite of all 
prevailing knowledge, the complexity of the atmospheric 
composition still confounds the perfect understanding of all 
dimensions of the problem. In other words, although a 
consensus has already been achieved as regards the ozone 
depleting nature of CFCs and the halons, scientific 
uncertainties and debates continue to a certain extent 
within the field.
2.2. Effects of CFCs and ozone depletion on life on earth:
CFCs and ozone depletion are claimed to bring forth 
mainly two grave consequences: undesired or fatal biological 
changes on the living organisms and a contribution to the 
greenhouse effect. These consequences will be briefly 
touched upon in this section.
The atmospheric ozone which constitutes a thin but 
extremely protective layer against the sun's harmful 
ultraviolet lights is a vital source for the life on our planet. It 
is situated at the troposphere-stratosphere boundary and 
absorbs UV-B radiation that is between the wavelengths of 
280 and 300 nanometers (16). UV-B radiation is potent 
enough to produce biological changes on the living
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organisms. With the total disappearance of the ozone layer, 
all the UV-B would get through and the life on earth would 
be completely impossible (17), Other than protecting the 
planet, ozone also regulates the stratospheric climate by 
absorbing and depositing the sun's ultraviolet lights so that 
the temperatures do not decrease with the increasing 
altitude (18).
The current level of understanding and estimating 
indicates the fact that each percent of decrease in the total 
ozone will make a 2 percent increase in the amount of UV-B 
reaching the earth (19). Since increased UV-B causes 
mutations in cells, this amount of increment is estimated to 
cause an 8 percent rise in skin cancer in light skinned 
people (20),
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 
estimated that there could be over 150 
million new cases of skin cancer in the 
United States alone among people 
currently alive or born by the year 2075, 
resulting in over 3 million deaths (with 
an uncertainty range of 1.5 to 4.5 
million). On the basis of the same 
parameters, EPA also projected 18 
million additional eye cataract cases in
13
the United States, many of which would 
result in blindness (21).
Also, the United Nations Environment Programme 
organized a panel in 1989 (Environmental Effects of Ozone 
Depletion). The reports of the panel revealed the direct 
effects of increasing UV-B radiation on man and on life on 
earth (22). Scientific developments affirmed the previous 
knowledge that UV-B radiation has various effects on man, 
animals, plants and materials:
Studies have been conducted on effects 
of increased UVB irradiance on human 
health, plants, aquatic organisms, air 
quality and man-made materials. 
Significant changes are likely in each of 
these areas. With regard to a few effect 
areas, investigators feel confident enough 
with the results to provide quantitative 
predictions. In other areas, the findings 
give reason for concern, but the effects 
cannot yet be quantified or confirmed 
(23).
According to the same report, the ozone hole over 
Antarctica during early spring has been observed and the 
resulting intensity of UV-B radiation reaching this part of
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the earth has been confirmed by the relevant data and 
measurements. Also, it is stated that ozone layer depletion 
has already begun at temperate latitudes (30-60), In 
addition to this, the increase in the effective UV-B at 
tropical latitudes is measured to be at least as great as the 
increase at the Antarctic region (24).
Concerning human health, it is recorded in the 
report that 'suppressions of the immune system' can be 
observed as a result of increments in UV-B radiation. As well 
as causing an increase in the 'occurrence or severity of 
infectious diseases', this can also constitute an impediment 
for the effectiveness of vaccinations (25), Moreover, 
increase in harmful UV-B radiation is potent enough to 
cause eye damages and cataracts which may bring forth 
gruesome results like blindness. "Cataracts were estimated 
to increase by 0.6 % per 1 % ozone depletion. This increase 
would amount to 100.000 additional blind persons 
world-wide" (26). Furthermore, it is indicated in the report 
that non-melanoma skin cancer will rise and this will be in 
terms of a 3% increase in every 1% decrease of the ozone 
layer. There is also a conjecture that there will be an 
increase in 'more dangerous cutaneous melanoma' cases 
(27).
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According to the same report, the research on plant 
species reveals the fact that half of the investigated species 
are sensitive to increments in UV-B radiation. Sometimes, 
UV-B radiation can lead to alterations in the chemical 
compositions of these plants which in turn affect the food 
quality. Harmful UV-B irradiance is estimated to cause up to 
a 25% decline in food 3deld in some soybean species "for an 
exposure simulating a 25% ozone depletion" (28).
Moreover, it is observed that ozone depletion has 
similar adverse effects on aquatic organisms such as, 
phytoplankton, zooplankton, carval crabs and shrimp, and 
juvenile fish (29). This can bring forth negative 
consequences for the productivity of fisheries. Also, since 
phytoplankton constitutes the major sink for carbon 
dioxide, a decline in phytoplankton can lead to an increase 
in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. Thus, 
this result can be a contribution to the greenhouse effect.
Furthermore, ozone depletion is also estimated to 
aggravate the air pollution problem on earth. The reason for 
the degradation of the air quality is the fact that increased 
UV-B radiation can enhance the chemical reactivity in the 
troposphere. Also, degradation of materials -especially 
plastics used outdoors- as a result of exposure to intense
16
UV-B radiation is another consequence of the ozone layer 
depletion (30).
The second adverse effect of the ozone problem is 
claimed to be a contribution to the greenhouse effect 
-which appears in the scene as another major ecological 
threat. The greenhouse effect implies the process of 
depositing the sun's infrared radiation (31). Trapping this 
infrared radiation is vital for making the world a warm and 
habitable planet. Especially carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide gases are responsible for absorbing the 
radiation which v/ould escape from the earth otherwise
(32) . However, excessive global increase in the amount of 
these greenhouse gases impairs the stability of the earth’s 
average temperature and confronts us with the problem of 
climate warming (See Table I), What concerns us at this 
point is the fact that CFCs are confirmed to be as effective as 
carbon dioxide in their contribution to climate warming
(33) . Their contribution to the greenhouse effect is 
approximately 17% (34). In addition to this, there is a 
'currently not well understood’ connection and reciprocal 
effect between ozone depletion and the greenhouse effect. 
In the Joint Symposium on Ozone Depletion, Greenhouse 
Gases, and Climate Change, held at the National Academy of
17
Sciences (NAS) on March 23,1988 these two issues were 
considered to be intermingled:
...the two issues are inextricably entwined 
and from part of the larger global change 
issue that recognizes that essentially all 
com p on en ts  o f  the ea rth  
-atmosphere-ocean-biosphere-cryospher 
e system interact with and affect one 
another, often in ways that are currently 
not well understood (35).
Table I. Some of the Greenhouse Gases and Their Rate of 
Increase
Gas Concentration Rate of Increase
- Carbon Dioxide 345 ppm 0.4 % per year
- Methane 1.65 ppm 1.1 % per year
- Nitrous Oxide 305 ppb 0.2 % per year
- CFC-11 220 ppt 5 % per year
- CFC-12 380 ppt 5 % per year
Source: NRC (National Research Council), Current Issues in 
Atmospheric Change (1987).
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2.3. The history of ozone depletion: A review
Prior to its emergence in the international arena as a 
major environmental problem, ozone depletion and its 
drastic results had already caused a wide-scale 
pandemonium in the United States for several years. The 
firs t people that discovered the perils o f 
chlorofluorocarbons were Sherwood Rowland and Mario 
Molina who were two American chemists dealing with 
scientific research (36). In 1973, as a result of their studies, 
they developed a theory that man-made chlorofluorocarbons 
could destroy the stratospheric ozone layer. Six months 
later, their paper was published in N a tu re . and in 
September 1974 they were able to discuss their theory for 
the first time publicly at the American Chemical Society 
meeting (37).
The environmental groups and the public concern in 
the United States more or less responded to the issue, 
whereas the industry was disturbed by the theory and was 
far from incurring the drastic results of CFC emissions. 
Thus, "...theories came... as an economic as well as 
environmental bombshell. Because new uses had continually 
been found for CFCs, their production had soared from 
150.000 metric tons in 1960 to over 800.000 metric tons
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by 1974" (see Fig. Ill) (38). This production generated 8 
billion dollars in business and 200.000 people were 
employed in the field (39). It was insisted that such a giant 
industry could not be destroyed for the sake of an unproved 
theory and insufficient evidence since the United States 
accounted for about 29% of the production and sales of 
CFCs. For instance, Du Pont -the United States' greatest CFG 
producing company- insisted strongly that all the facts were 
not in, therefore, the industry should not be sacrificied in 
vain (40). In short, the initial response of the industry was 
to deny that such a problem existed.
Figure III. Trend of CFG Production
Source: EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), Assessing the Risks
of Trace Gases That Can Modify the Stratosphere, Vol. 2 (1987).
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The Rowland-Molina theory attracted the attention of 
both the public and the government in the United States to 
a certain extent. In 1974, it was suggested by the 
government that the National Academy of Sciences should 
make a research to find out whether or not the 
Rowland-Molina theory was valid (41). In 1976, the report 
was finished and it verified the theory, however, the 
research complexities were the main impediments for 
scientific certainty and consensus: therefore, the report 
stated that the government should postpone the CFG 
regulations (42). Before NAS released its report, in 1975 
The Natural Resources Defense Council had sued the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission in order to obtain a 
ban on the chlorofluorocarbons in spray cans. However, one 
month later the lawsuit was rejected due to insufficient 
evidence on CFCs' harmful effects (43). In spite of this, 
Oregon had become the first state to ban the use of CFCs in 
aerosol sprays (44). Furthermore, another promising 
development was the 1977 amendment of the Clean Air Act 
to protect the stratospheric ozone (45).
These domestic developments in the United States 
were obviously reflected in the international arena. In 1976, 
the United Nations Environment Programme Governing
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Council called for an international meeting. This meeting 
was held in Washington in March 1977. As a result of this 
meeting, a World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer’ was 
established (46).
The plan of action recommended 
intensive international research and 
monitoring of the situation, and 
m andated to UNEP a central 
coordinating responsibility for promoting 
research and gathering relevant 
economic and scientific data (47).
Later, in 1978 the United States law brought a ban on the 
use of chlorofluorocarbons in nonessential aerosols which 
was also followed in the international field by other 
countries like Canada, Sweden and Norway (48).
Finally, UNEP moved to the stage in 1981 for 
multilateral negotiations on a convention for the protection 
of the ozone layer. After four years of negotiations, in 1985 
delegates coming from different countries signed the 
Vienna Convetion which was a framework agreement on 
ozone depletion (49).
As these developments occurred in the international 
field, scientific inquiry was continuing in terms of
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predictions about ozone concentrations of present and 
future times, percentage estimations for the amount of 
decrease, and further assessments of adverse effects of 
man-made gases on the ozone layer. In 1981, NASA 
scientist Donald Health claimed that satellite records 
presented a one percent decline in the ozone layer (50). 
Later, in 1982 the National Academy of Sciences released 
its third report stating that the eventual ozone depletion 
was estimated to be 5 to 9 percent (51). But in February 
1984, at the end of a two-year research NAS in its fourth 
report lowered the predictions of the estimated potential 
depletion to 2 to 4 percent. However, the news which made 
a bombshell effect was given by a group of British scientists 
led by Joe Farman. In October 1984, as a results of 
land-based measurements made at Halley Bay, they detected 
a 40 percent decline in ozone over Antarctica (52). When 
the inauspicious news was announced, it astonished the 
whole world tremendously. Later on, in August 1985 the 
existence of an ozone hole was also confirmed by NASA's 
satellite photos (53).
Two years later, in 1987, the Montreal Protocol 
which called for an eventual 50-percent world-wide 
reduction of CFCs was achieved. However, scientific
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evidence continued to indicate the urgency of stricter 
controls. In March 1988, the Ozone Trends Panel 
announced that 1.7 to 3 percent ozone decline had been 
found over the northern hemisphere (54). In September of 
the same year EPA stated that new evidence showed an 
underestimation of the degree of future ozone depletion and 
called for an 85% cutback on CFCs (55). Eventually, in 1990 
in London the controls and reductions on the ozone 
depleting chemicals were strengthened by the parties of 
the Protocol.
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3. Major legal and political achievements on ozone 
depletion:
In part 2.3, we have dealt with the events in a 
chronological order, refraining most of the time from 
bringing any manifest interpretations. However, this part of 
the study will make a wide-scale analysis of the major 
political and legal developments regarding ozone depletion. 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete 
the Ozone Layer and the London Revision to the Montreal 
Protocol are the three corner-stones of the international 
political evolution and they are the major symbols of 
multinational compromise as far as ozone depletion is 
concerned. For this reason, each of them will be posed to a 
more detailed analysis in this section.
3.1. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer:
The premise of the Vienna Convention was a 
three-year endeavor perpetuated especially by the United 
Nations Environment Programme. UNEP had considered 
the ozone layer depletion as a major predicament; thus, had 
given priority to it in its program before any other issue
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(56). Other international organizations such as the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
European Community (EC) were also involved in the ozone 
layer depletion issue (57). however, UNEP appeared as a 
major figure in its efforts to impede the growth of the 
problem to bigger dimensions. Thus, in 1981 UNEP's 
Governing Council decided that the process for establishing 
a convention with respect to ozone depletion should be 
started. Later on, in 1982 the Governing Council convened 
an ad hoc legal and technical working group for the 
preparation of a global framework convention for the 
protection of the ozone layer (58). Unfortunately, 
negotiations took three more years since the issue of ozone 
depletion had lost its appeal for some political and legal 
groups and countries. Finally, all the states participating in 
the meetings agreed to sign the fifth revised draft prepared 
by the ad hoc working committee due to the fact that prior 
drafts were considered to be unacceptable by some of the 
negotiating countries (59). In point of fact, the first draft 
was sufficient to polarize the countries into two groups as 
the 'Toronto Group’ and the European Community (60), the 
reasons of which will be disclosed in the following sections. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this part it is appropriate to
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state that the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer-signed by twenty major CFC producer states, 
plus the European Community Commission on 22 March, 
1985-established only a framework for dealing with the 
ozone depletion problem. It brought regulations in terms of 
international cooperation on research, information 
exchange and monitoring. In other words, the Convention 
could not set definite rules and bring control measures with 
respect to global production and emission of CFCs and other 
harmful chemicals due to some contending opinions and 
approaches among different states.
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer embodies twenty one articles. The articles 
which concern this thesis will be examined in detail within 
the following paragraphs.
Article 2 is the heart of the Convention and 
established the general rules and obligations for the 
participants. It requires all the Parties to take measures in 
accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention. 
The Article calls the Parties for cooperation in terms of 
systematic observations, research and information 
exchange. This kind of a cooperation is required for a better 
perception and assessment as far as the impacts of human
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activities on the ozone layer, and the effects of modifications 
of ozone on human health and the environment are 
concerned. Also, appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures shall be adopted and further cooperation will be 
referred to in order to harmonize and enhance the policies 
to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities 
provided that these activities have or are likely to have 
adverse effects resulting from modification or likely 
modification of the ozone layer. Here, it is apparent that no 
specific human action or no particular substance is implied 
as being responsible for the modifications of ozone. This is a 
deliberate refrainment which serves the interests of some 
of the Parties. Also, Article 2 provides collaboration in the 
formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards 
with respect to implementation of the Convention, and it 
requires cooperation with competent international bodies. 
Furthermore, it provides that the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention shall neither prevent the Parties from adopting 
domestic measures in accordance with the international 
law, nor affect other domestic measures already taken by a 
Party.
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention is a related with 
research and systematic observations. It establishes
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cooperation and collaboration between the Parties, directly 
or through competent international bodies, in order to 
conduct scientific research on issues such as, the physical 
and chemical processes that may affect the ozone layer, the 
human health and other bilogical effects deriving from any 
modiciations of the ozone layer, alternative substances and 
technologies, etc. Also, Article 3 calls the Parties for 
systematic observation of the ozone layer and other relevant 
parameters by establishing joint or complementary 
programmes. Finally, it requires that the Parties cooperate 
in providing the collection, validation and transmission of 
research and observational data through world data centers 
regularly and in appropriate time. Thus, as it can be seen 
Article 3 ensures that the Parties promote and enhance 
scientific knowledge so that a better understanding can be 
established with respect to the ozone layer depletion.
The first paragraph of Article 4 again calls for 
cooperation as regards the exchange of scientific, technical, 
socio-economic, commercial and legal information among 
the Parties. Such information shall be supplied to bodies 
that are confirmed by consensus. Information shall be kept 
in discretion provided that the Party regards it as 
confidential. Also, paragraph two of Article 4 stipulates that
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particular needs of the developing countries will be taken 
into consideration by the Parties. Therefore, cooperation 
will be in terms of facilitation of the acquisition of 
alternative technologies by these countries, training of 
technical and scientific personnel, the supply of necessary 
equipment for research and systematic observation, etc. 
This article of the Vienna Convention constitutes a good 
example for the appropriate treatment of the developing 
countries as far as collaboration and technology transfers are 
concerned. Thus, Article 4 can be regarded as an incentive 
for the developing countries to view the Convention as a 
more appealing agreement.
Article 8 of the Convention is important since it 
provides that the Conference of the Parties might adopt 
protocols in accordance with the contents of Article 2. In 
addition to this article, a Resolution on a Protocol 
Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons was also adopted (61). This 
resolution was introduced by the Toronto Group at the last 
moment in Vienna. The resolution which was distinct from 
the Convention endowed the UNEP with the authority to 
start negotiations for achieving a legally binding protocol in 
1987 (62). Thus, this constituted a promising approach 
with respect to future treatments of the ozone issue.
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Article 9 is concerned with the amendment of the 
Convention or protocols. It establishes that any Party can 
make proposals regarding amendments to the Vienna 
Convention or to any protocol as long as they take into 
account relevant scientific and technical matters. 
Furthermore, it provides the necessary conditions and 
procedures for reaching a consensus and adopting 
amendments to the Convention or protocols.
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer was far from supplying precautionary measures 
which might eradicate the ozone depletion problem; 
nevertheless, it should be considered as a reconciliation of 
the contending self-interests of different states. Thus, as a 
final word it can be said that the Convention s}mibolizes a 
first international legal step and aggregate endorsement 
against the future impacts of ozone depletion on human 
beings and nature.
3.2. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer:
The international response against the inadequacy 
and limitations of the Vienna Convention came very soon. 
Two months after the Convention, the British scientists
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published data which manifested a seasonal Antarctic ozone 
hole (63). In other words, scientific indications also 
supported the fact that the Convention was insufficient in 
many aspects. As it was mentioned, a Resolution on a 
Protocol Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons, which was 
distinct from the Convention itself, was adopted by the 
participants of the Vienna Convention. Thus UNEP, in 
accordance with the aims of the Resolution, sponsored 
several workshops and conferences designed for further 
discussions and understanding of ozone depletion. The first 
workshop was held in Rome in May 1986, and a following 
conference sponsored together with EPA came in June 
1986 (64). In July 1986, the World Meteorological 
Organization and UNEP published the results of a combined 
research and assessment (65). Again, in September 1986, 
another UNEP workshop was held in Virginia (66). Soon, 
the first round of protocol negotiations began in December 
1986 (67). In February 1987 (Vienna) the second and in 
April 1987 (Geneva) the third meetings for the negotiations 
were realized (68). Finally, twenty four countries signed the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone 
Layer on 16 September 1987 in Montreal. Canada, The 
Montreal Protocol entered into force on January 1, 1989 
and by the time of the First Meeting of the Parties "held in
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Helsinki, May 2-5, 1989, thirty-six countries, accounting for 
about 85 percent of global consumption of CFCs and halons, 
had ratified it" (69). Later, by June 1990, 58 countries in 
addition to the European Community-accounting for about 
99% of world production and 90% of consumption-had 
ratified the Montreal Protocol (70).
It should be firstly mentioned that the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol recognize that emissions of certain 
substances can deplete or modify the ozone layer and this in 
turn can bring forth adverse impacts on human health and 
environment. They are also conscious of the climatic effect 
of emissions of such substances. Thus, they are determined 
to prevent the ozone layer depletion by taking precautionary 
measures in terms of controlling total global emissions of 
these substances-with the ultimate objective of their future 
elimination. These major statements written at the very 
beginning of the Protocol are significant in the sense that 
nowhere did the Vienna Convention even hint at particular 
substances that deplete the ozone layer or allude to 
precautionary measures and controls against emissions of 
these hazardous substances.
The Montreal Protocol includes twenty articles. 
Article 1 comprises the definitions of some words or word
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groups implied within the text of the Protocol so that a 
confusion as regards the meaning of the text does not occur. 
Some of these words or word groups are 'controlled 
substance', 'production', 'consumption', 'calculated levels', 
'industrial rationalization', etc.
Article 2 constitutes the crux of the Protocol since it 
is concerned with the necessary control measures against 
the production and consumption of harmful substances. 
This article and the amount of reductions were later on 
considered as inadequate by scientists and environmental 
groups (71). The states, indeed, had failed to adopt stricter 
measures to abate the future adverse impacts of the 
problem, and the main reason for this was the unresolved 
conflicts among them.
The controlled substances are listed within the 
annex of the Protocol and they are divided into two groups 
as CFCs and halons. The two groups of substances are 
treated differently, and next to each of the particular 
substance its ozone depleting potential is recorded. While 
the production and consumption levels of the first group of 
chemicals will be reduced in accordance with the 
provisions of the Protocol, the production and consumption 
levels of the second group, namely halons, will be kept
34
stable at 1986 levels. The first four paragraphs of Article 2 
require that beginning on the first day of the seventh month 
following the date of entiy into force of the Protocol, each 
Party freeze the production and consumption levels of 
Group 1 and Group 11 chemicals at the 1986 levels for the 
first twelve months. Then, for the period 1 July 1993 to 30 
June 1994 and each twelve-month period thereafter, each 
Party must reduce the production and consumption of 
Group 1 chemicals to 80% of the 1986 levels, and finally for 
the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 and in each twelve 
month period thereafter, each Party must reduce the 
production and consumption of Group I chemicals to 50% 
of the 1986 levels. However, Article 2 also tolerates a 
10-15% excess production provided that it is for the 
purpose of 'industrial rationalization* between the Parties 
(which according to the definition of the Protocol is the 
transfer of all or a portion of the calculated level of 
production of one Party to another, for the purpose of 
achieving economic efficiencies or responding to 
anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant closures) 
or it is for the purpose of satisfying the basic domestic 
needs of the Parties operating under Article 5-namely 
developing countries. This kind of flexibility was offered in
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order to promote the participation rate of developing 
countries to the Protocol.
Further concessions were also made for the support 
and encouragement of other countries' participation. 
Paragraph 6 of Article 2 provides that any Party having 
facilities for the production of controlled substances under 
construction prior to 16 September 1987 may add them to 
its 1986 production level in order to determine its 
allowable amount of production for coming years. This 
provision was especially formed "to accommodate the Soviet 
Union's ongoing five-year plan for new CFG plants" (72).
The eighth paragraph of Article 2 is concerned with 
regional economic organizations. It establishes that any 
Parties which are Member States of a regional economic 
integration organization may decide that they shall Join the 
Protocol provided that their level of total consumption does 
not go beyond the limits set forth by Article 2. However, 
such an agreement could only be operative if all Member 
States become parties to the Montreal Protocol. This 
provision was presented as a compromise to the European 
Economic Community since the Community strongly 
insisted on being treated as a single unit (73). Other 
countries had serious doubts and concerns about this
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demand of the European Community, thus they tried to 
prevent the approval of such a proposal. However, finally it 
was agreed that the European Community members would 
be treated as a unity only for the purpose of consumption 
but not for the purpose of production (74).
Paragraph 9 of the article states that based on the 
assessments made pursuant to Article 6, the Parties may 
decide about: probable adjustments to the ozone depleting 
potentials of controlled substances, and further adjustments 
and reductions of production or consumption of the 
controlled substances in terms of definite scope, amount 
and timing. Again, paragraph 10 states that the Parties may 
decide whether any substances should be added to or 
removed from any annex to this Protocol and in what scope 
and timing the control mechanisms should be applied to 
those substances. Finally, paragraph 11 provides that the 
Parties may take more strict measures than those required 
by the Article. Thus, these three paragraphs of Article 2 
indicate that the control measures of the Montreal Protocol 
are not static but they are rather open to revisions and 
reassessments.
Article 3 of the Montreal Protocol deals with the 
calculation of control levels of the substances listed in
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Annex A, It provides the procedures necessary for 
calculating the levels of production, imports and exports, 
and consumption of controlled substances.
Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol is significant in 
the sense that it deals with the control of trade with 
non-parties, thus constitutes a vital enforcement 
mechanism within the Protocol. The final aim of the 
negotiations prior to the Montreal Protocol was to design a 
protocol encouraging optimum participation by presenting 
incentives for world states and preventing non-parties from 
enjoying competitive advantages in the CFC market. 
However, conflicting views and debates predominated the 
negotiations as far as the trade restrictions were concerned 
(75). Consequently, the final provisions of the Protocol with 
respect to the trade restrictions were exposed to later 
criticisms as well (76).
The first paragraph of Article 4 states that each Party 
will ban the import of controlled substances(in bulk form) 
from non-parties within one year of the entry into force. 
This restriction aims at making the expansion of 
non-parties' production less profitable by denying any kind 
of opportunity to export to the Protocol members. 
According to the second paragraph developing countries
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shall not export any controlled substances to non-parties 
beginning on I January 1993. Paragraph 3 of Article 4 says 
that within three years of the date of the entry into force a 
list of products containing controlled substances shall be 
elaborated in an annex in accordance with Article 10 of 
Vienna Convention, and the countries that do not object to 
the annex will ban the import of those products from 
non-party states within one year. However, this provision is 
criticised for allowing a Party to ignore the trade 
restrictions since a Party which objects to the annex is not 
compelled to ban the import of such products. Only the 
ones that approve the annex have to take precautionary 
measures and restrict the import of products that include 
controlled substances (77). Another type of product that is 
subjected to import ban is the product produced with but 
not containing controlled substances any more. If the 
Parties regard such a restriction feasible, these products 
will also be subjected to an import ban. Also, each Party 
should discourage technology transfer or export to 
non-party states for producing or utilizing controlled 
substances.
In fact, it was also assumed that as a result of trade 
restrictions and a shrinking market, the industry would be
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confronted with a compulsion for producing substitutes to 
ozone-depleting chemicals. For this end. cooperation among 
the Parties for facilitating development of substitutes to the 
controlled substances was envisaged in Article 9 as well.
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol is concerned with 
the special situation of developing countries. Since their 
participation was regarded as essential for the 
accomplishment of the Protocol, many provisions were 
provided for promoting the interests of developing 
countries. For instance, as it was mentioned in Article 2, 
developed countries are allowed to produce and transfer 
10-15% excess controlled substances to developing 
countries, thus a developing country which is a member of 
the Protocol does not necessarily have to produce its own 
CFCs (78). Just as Article 2, Article 5 offers many facilities 
to developing countries. The Article provides that any Party 
which is a developing country and whose annual calculated 
level of consumption of the ozone-depleting chemicals is 
less than 0.3 kilograms per capita can delay its compliance 
with the control measures. In other words. Article 5 
provides an exemption of 10 years for developing countries. 
Again, it states that developed countries, in order to help 
developing countries, shall facilitate access to substitutes of
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the ozone-depleting chemicals. They will also assist them in 
using such environmentally safe alternative substances. This 
is crucial for developing countries since access to new and 
safe technologies is a difficult and rather expensive process. 
Finally, Article 5 also envisages subsidies, aid, credits, 
guarantees or insurance programmes for the use of 
alternative technologies by developing countries.
Article 6 deals with assessment and review of the 
control measures of the Montreal Protocol. It stipulates that 
beginning from 1990 examining and assessment of control 
measures will be arranged every four years, and appropriate 
panels related with the review process will be held at least 
one year before each assessment. Article 7 of the Montreal 
Protocol is related with the procedure of each Party's 
reporting of the statistical data about its production, 
imports and exports-regarding the controlled substances 
for the year 1986 and from then on annually. The next 
article which is number 8 is concerned with 
non-compliance. It establishes that at their first meeting 
the Parties shall adopt necessary procedures and 
institutional mechanisms with respect to treatment of 
non-compliance with the provisions of the Montreal 
Protocol.
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The Montreal Protocol also stipulates cooperation 
among the Parties. Article 9 of the Protocol provides that 
the Parties collaborate-directly or through competent 
international bodies-in enhancing and facilitating research, 
development and exchange of information on; best 
technologies for improving the containment, recovery, 
recycling or destruction of controlled substances, possible 
substitutes to controlled substances, and cost and benefits 
of relevant control strategies.
Article 10 is also important since it envisages 
technical assistance in accordance with the particular needs 
of the developing countries in order to facilitate their 
participation in the Protocol. Thus, the Parties shall 
cooperate to promote support of the developing countries.
Despite its limitations and loopholes, the Montreal 
Protocol was a landmark agreement in the history of 
international environmental politics. The Protocol was the 
first multinational treaty with the purpose of solving a global 
atmospheric problem (79). Thus, it deserves praise because 
persistent scientific uncertainties and divergent economic 
interests could not obstruct the final consensus on the 
ozone issue.
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However, the afore-mentioned weakness and 
insufficiency of the control measures and trade restrictions 
overshadowed the success of the Protocol to a certain 
extent. The world obviously had anticipated a better result 
promising a much safer and brighter future.
3.3. The London Revision to the Montreal Protocol:
As it can be presumed, scientific evidence and 
environmentalist criticisms did not cease exerting pressure 
on the CFC industry and decision-makers after the Protocol. 
Therefore, in 1990 the Montreal Protocol underwent a 
series of revisions. The details of these revisions will be 
displayed within the following paragraphs of this section.
With respect to control measures established for 
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer, the London Revision 
manifestly corroborates the Protocols' provisions. While the 
Montreal Protocol arranged a 20% reduction beginning in 
mid-1993 and a 50% reduction beginning in mid-1998 
regarding the production and consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons, the London revision approves a 50% 
reduction in 1995, and a 85% reduction in 1997, and finally 
a total phaseout of chlorofluorocarbons in 2000. In addition 
to this, it provides that the time-table will be reassessed in
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1992 with the main target of accelerating reductions. 
Concerning halons, the Montreal Protocol stipulated only 
freezing of the production and consumption levels of these 
chemicals at 1986 levels in 1992; however, in addition to 
this provision, the London Revision envisages a 50% 
reduction in 1995 and total phaseout in 2000. Also, ten 
other fully halogenated CFCs were not included in Montreal 
Protocol. The London Revision to the Protocol establishes a 
20% reduction from 1989 levels in 1993, and 85% 
reduction in 1997 and total phaseout in 2000 for these 
halogenated CFCs. Carbon tetrachloride is another chemical 
which was ignored in the Montreal Protocol, but the London 
decisions bring also an 85% reduction from 1989 levels in 
1995 and a phaseout in 2000. Moreover, methyl chloroform 
which was not included in the Protocol is subjected to a 
freeze at 1989 levels in 1993, a 30% reduction in 1995, a 
70% reduction in 2000 and a total phaseout in 2005 as well. 
This schedule will also be reassessed in 1992 with a target 
of accelerating reductions. Concerning other halons. Annex 
Vll of the Protocol -a nonbinding resolution- discourages 
usage, and demands reporting on annual production and 
consumption. Furthermore, according to the same 
nonbinding resolution (Annex Vlll), the Parties are called 
for a phaseout no later than 2040, and if possible by 2020.
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With respect to the voting of the Parties, the 
Revision brings amendments as well. No change is required 
in the procedure of voting for addition of new substances: 
nevertheless, concerning the adjustments in reduction of 
already controlled substances, while the Montreal Protocol 
required approval by two-thirds of the Parties representing 
at least 50% of consumption of all Parties, the Revision 
requires approval by two-thirds of the Parties including 
seperate majorities of developing countries and 
industrialised countries.
Developing countries’ obligations were specified in 
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol. As it was mentioned 
above, the Protocol endorsed a ten-year exemption in order 
to meet basic domestic needs of such countries. No specific 
alteration is made for this provision, but for new controlled 
substances the annual consumption limit is determined as
0.2 kilogram per capita. Also, according to the London 
Revision, if a developing Party claims that financial aid and 
technology transfers are insufficient to comply with the 
obligations of the treaty, the Party can appeal for a meeting 
of the Parties. Concerning financial assistance, the Montreal 
Protocol stated that the Parties should provide aid to 
developing countries. In addition to this provision.
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developing countries will be financed by a Multilateral 
Fund-administered by the World Bank and operate under 
the authority of the Parties who shall decide on its overall 
policies- in order to be able to conform to the control 
measures. Also, feasibility studies and technical assistance 
will be financed by the same Multilateral Fund. 
Furthermore, in addition to the initial provisions for 
technology transfer, the revision of the Protocol provides 
that each Party take every practicable step, in accordance 
with the programmes supported by the financial 
mechanisms, to transfer available and related technologies 
to developing countries under fair and most favourable 
conditions.
Trade restrictions of the Protocol are also revised 
due to the addition of new chemicals to the list of 
controlled substances. The Montreal Protocol had 
prohibited exports of controlled substances in bulk form 
from developing countries beginning in 1993. The 
revised-form of the related article brings prohibition on 
exports in bulk form from all parties. For new chemicals, 
the prohibition date begins in 1993. Also, import of 
controlled substances in bulk form from non-parties was 
prohibited beginning in 1990. For new controlled
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substances the prohibition begins in 1993. Furthermore, 
another type of product prohibited for imports from 
non-parties beginning in 1993 was the product containing 
controlled substances. These kinds of products will be 
subjected to prohibition beginning in 1996. Finally, as 
regards the import of products made with new controlled 
substances, the Parties will determine the feasibility of ban 
by 1997.
Thus, the above comparison between the initial 
provisions and their revised forms reveals the significant 
improvements acquired on the regime for the protection of 
the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol has finally become 
an exemplary agreement dedicated to the protection of the 
global environment.
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4. Ek:ological threat leading to international cooperation?
To begin with, it would be appropriate to make a 
review of contrary and much more pessimistic approaches 
underestimating the possibility of global cooperation which 
could avert the environmental afflictions and tragedies. 
Such views derive their pessimism from conjectures that 
environmental degradation and the resulting resource 
scarcities would condemn states to inevitable discrepancies 
and conflicts. For instance, one of the earliest works on 
global environmental politics, the L im it to Growth had 
projected an apocalyptic future for the earth by the year 
2000 (80). The book predicted an impending decline of the 
natural environment due to the growth of world population 
and industry, and warned people about probable collapse of 
modern century. Also, Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. 
Wittkopf state in The Global Agenda that:
A global environment characterized by 
resource scarcities may invite the classic 
kinds of interstate conflict -and war- that 
once characterized competition over 
territory... Finally, war, the traditional 
mechanism of settling interstate
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disputes, may itself bring about an 
ecological catastrophe (81).
Furthermore, William Ophuls, the author of Ecology 
and the Politics o f Scarcity, also does not believe that 
international cooperation would prevail in the global society 
in the face of impending ecological disasters (82). Ophuls 
indicates that due to the absence of an international 
authority, the world states live in a Hobbesian state of nature 
where each of them pursue their own self-interests. 
Therefore, in such an anarchical system where resources of 
the earth are limited, it is natural that states are unable to 
maintain collaboration. Ophuls says that:
Thus the disappearance of ecological 
abundance seems bound to make 
international politics even more tension 
ridden and potentially violent than it 
already is. Indeed, the pressures of 
ecological scarcity may embroil the world 
in hopeless strife, so that long before 
ecological collapse occurs by virtue of the 
physical limitations of the earth, the 
current world order will have been 
destroyed by turmoil and war-a truly 
horrible prospect, given the profoundly 
anti- ecological character of modern 
warfare... (83).
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At this point, the term 'resource scarcity’ mentioned 
by Kegley and Wittkopf, and Ophuls may receive the 
attention of the reader, A question concerning the relation 
between ozone depletion and resource scarcity can appear 
in one's mind. Does ozone depletion bring forth a resource 
scarcity? The answer is obviously 'yes'. The 
atmosphere-which endows our earth with substances 
bearing imponderable vitality for living beings and which 
shields the earth against the harmful effects of the sun-is 
definitely a resource for our planet. Thus, pollution and 
ozone depletion are the symptoms of the scarcity of this 
resource.
As it was mentioned before, in accordance with the 
purpose of this thesis ozone depletion will be illustrated as 
an exemplary case refuting the apocalyptic arguments and 
theories above. In other words, this study challenges the 
views that are the epitomes of pessimism with respect to 
international cooperation against ecological threats. In fact, 
unprecedented accomplishments of international 
coopera t ion-cover ing  the before ment ioned 
agreements-have been achieved as regards ozone depletion. 
Nevertheless, while the ozone depletion issue will be 
presented as a promising case for environmental
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cooperation, at the same time the factors which 
complicated the attempts and limited the success to a 
certain extent in the way to global collaboration will not be 
ignored in this section. For this end, different approaches of 
world states towards the issue and the discrepancies 
accrued among them will also be displayed.
As it can be presumed, diverse approaches were 
presented by different states to tackle with the ozone 
depletion problem. The United States, Canada and the 
Nordic countries constituted a group which strove for 
internationally binding regulations from the very beginning, 
whereas, the European Community supported by Japan 
showed a manifest refrainment and abstention towards the 
establishment of global precautionary measures against the 
ozone depletion problem (84). As for the developing 
countries, initially they did not participate actively to 
enhance the impending ozone regime since they were more 
concerned about their economic needs and problems (85).
Differences of opinion between the United States and 
the European Community emerged at the very begining of 
the ozone depletion problem. As it was mentioned in the 
preceding sections, the United States-producer of nearly 
30% of world CFC demand-had taken national measures for
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the sake of protecting the ozone layer in the late 1970s. 
The U.S. government demanded the European Community 
to pursue the same policy since otherwise the precautionary 
measures would be uninfluential and the European 
industries would be in an advantageous position compared 
to the Americans (86). However, the Community was not 
eager to take bold steps for this issue. The European CFC 
industry accounted for about 40-45% of world's production 
and this obviously put pressure on policy makers (87). Thus, 
in 1980, the European Community endorsed only a freeze 
on production capacity-not on the actual production of 
CFCs-and a 30% cutback in CFC aerosol use from 1976 
levels (88). In fact, the Community feared that the United 
States would have restricted the access of European CFCs to 
the American market (89), therefore, it was a compulsory 
demonstration of willingness somehow. However, this was 
apparently an insignificant act since it was not limiting the 
actual production of the industry and the level of CFC 
aerosol use had already declined by 28% (90). In other 
words, the European Community was imposing nothing new 
but preserving the status-quo.
The Community continued to raise difficulties and 
complicated the negotiations on the way to the Vienna
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Convention. During the negotiations it became apparent that 
the European coruntries were not even ready to discuss a 
significant amount of reduction on the ozone depleting 
chemicals (91). As it was touched upon in the section 
concerning the Vienna Convection, the first draft prepared 
by the ad hoc working group divided the parties into two 
groups as the European Community, and the Toronto Group 
embodying the United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway and 
Finland. Whereas the Community favored a cap on the 
production capacity and a 30% cut in nonessential uses of 
CFC aerosols, the Toronto Group wanted to corroborate the 
restrictions and proposed an 80% reduction and a complete 
ban on nonessential uses of aerosols (92). They argued that 
the European industries were already producing under 
capacity-at 65%-therefore the agreement would not have 
brought any control measures to the Community (93). Also, 
another point of debate was related with the fact that the 
European Community was compelled to adopt regulations 
already adopted by the United States. Canada and the 
Scandinavian countries which had banned nonessential uses 
of CFC aerosols (94). The Community members also refused 
to accept this. Furthermore, the Community's desire was to 
be regarded as a unit and to become a party to the 
Convention without its members being obliged to sing the
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treaty (95). This proposal also caused pandemonium among 
the other participants. However, since such impediments 
seemed to imperil the accomplishment of the Convention, 
the United States and the other countries finally accepted 
the Community's access as a unit (96). Consequently, due to 
the reluctance of the European Community, the Vienna 
Convention was adopted only as a framework agreement 
promising future reductions of CFC emissions. In other 
words, the Toronto Group favoured a limited convention 
instead of a final failure.
The European Community's approach to the ozone 
issue is claimed to reflect only some members' attitudes 
(97). Indeed, conflicting views predominated in the 
Community. From the very beginning, the Netherlands and 
Denmark were eager to participate in promoting a binding 
agreement for the protection of the ozone layer, whereas, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany constituted 
the main obstacles for such a consensus (98). However, later 
on Germany, due to technological improvements and impact 
of public concern, altered its policy and developed a much 
more environmentalist approach. The other three, namely 
France, the United Kingdom and Italy continued pursuing 
the interests of their national industries and were
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vehemently against taking stringent measures on CFC 
emission (99). Thus, they forced the other members to 
adopt similar policies in accordance with the interests of 
the CFC industry. As a result, the external environmental 
policy of the European Community was shaped by these 
countries.
Also, the EC Commission’s aim was to gain more 
power and supremacy in the environmental issues with the 
Community (100). Although the Single European Act of 
1987 gave responsibility to the Commission in 
environmental political issues, the Commission actually 
"struggled with Member States to obtain an exclusive 
Community competence in external environment affairs" 
(101). In other words, as far as the ozone depletion problem 
was concerned, there were ambiguities with respect to the 
actual extent of EC Commission’s authority during the 
negotiations, and the Commission's enforcement 
mechanisms over the members were claimed to be 
insufficient and weak (102).
Thus, prevailing disunities within the Community 
protracted the establishment of a consensus among the 
world states. ’Internal decision-making incapacity’ of the 
European Community also plugged the negotiations of the
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Montreal Protocol form time to time (103). Points of debate 
intensified on the issues concerned especially with the 
control measures, trade restrictions against CFCs, etc. 
Initially, the Toronto Group advocated a freeze and a 
following 95% reduction of CFCs. In accordance with the 
interests of some countries-especially the United Kingdom 
and France-the European Community, propped up by Japan, 
was against of such a proposal (104). Then, as a compromise 
the Toronto Group offered a 50% reduction, but the 
Community insisted that it could not approve more than a 
20% cut (105). However, after long and tormenting 
negotiations the Europeans finally agreed on a 50% 
reduction until 1999 (106).
This was obviously an inadequate reduction in the 
face of scientific developments demonstrating the urgency 
of more stringent control measures. Therefore, 
achievement of the Montreal Protocol, which could have 
been much more powerful and brilliant, was restricted and 
sacrificed for the national interests of some countries.
What salvaged the Protocol from being a relatively 
weak response to the ozone depletion threat was the 
improvement and strengthening of its provisions in 1990. 
The environmentalist organisations and groups (the
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European Enviornmental Bureau, the European Bureau of 
Consumers, etc.), the public campaign, and the increasing 
media sensitivity against ozone depletion constituted a 
considerable amount of pressure on the industry and 
policy-makers (107). Denmark and Germany were eager to 
corroborate the control measures. Also, the United 
Kingdom's reluctant position altered in time due to its 
industry's progress towards producing substitutes for CFCs 
(108). Although France tried to resist the changing conduct 
of the Community for some time, consequently "the French 
government gave preference to its own political interests 
instead of defending its CFC producer and agreed to 
substantive reductions" (109). Furthermore, scientific 
evidence indicated the unabated urgency for a widening 
consensus on stronger international action. Under these 
circumstances, in 1989 the Community's Environment 
Council published an unexpected decision to ban the 
production and use of CFCs until 2000 (110). The United 
States government responded to it and declared that this 
policy will be followed (111). As a result of long debates and 
hard bargaining between the world states during the 
negotiations (112), afore-mentioned much stricter control 
measures were adopted in London, in June 1990 (see 
section 3.3).
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The Toronto Group's approach has been mentioned 
while dealing with the European Community's reservation 
and abstention towards the issue. It should be stated first of 
all that the United States claimed a leadership role in the 
ozone depletion problem (113). Initially, she adopted 
national control measures, then demanded the other CFC 
producers to follow the same path. Obviously, 
environmentalist organizations and groups and public 
opinion constituted the main domestic pressures on the 
government for making necessary regulations on CFCs. 
Indeed, Richard Elliot Benedick praises his nation's efforts 
for averting an environmental threat in his book Ozone 
Diplomacy (114), However, Diana M. Doolittle criticises the 
U.S. government's policy at least for a particular period by 
saying that "while government policy analysts were initially 
anxious to deal with ozone depletion, their ardour waned 
after the initial ban on CFC use in aerosols and after the 
Reagan administration took power" (115). Nevertheless, 
despite its limitations, it is a reality that the United States 
together with UNEP undertook the responsibility to develop 
a global plan and campaign with respect to the ozone 
depletion problem. She strove for a widening global 
consensus regarding the legally binding measures.
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Canada and Scandinavian countries, namely Sweden, 
Norway and Finland, from the very beginning pushed the 
world states for stringent control measures on CFCs (116). 
For instance, in 1984, Canada invited the states to a 
meeting held in Toronto (117). As a result of the meeting, 
the participants proposed a significant amount of reduction 
and a total ban of nonessential aerosols which were both 
refused by the opponent countries (see paragraph 7 of sec. 
4) (118). In fact, one of the reasons of these countries’ 
manifest eagerness for adoption of drastic reductions in CFC 
emissions is claimed to be related with their populations’ 
vulnerability to increased ultraviolet radiation. Skin type and 
latitude are considered as the factors determining the 
extent of vulnerability towards skin cancer (119). 
Therefore, these states acted as it would have been 
expected by being ’pushers’ in the negotiations (120). 
Australia and New Zealand were the other countries which 
vehemently supported the protection of the ozone layer 
( 121) .
Of particular relevance to the topic at hand is the 
Soviet Union’s and the developing countries' approaches to 
the problem. With respect to these countries the majority of 
CFC use was in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe
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and the OECD countries (122). China, India, Brazil and 
Mexico were among the producer countries and their 
demand for CFC consumption was increasing annually 
together with the other developing countries (123). In 
other words, exclusion of developing countries from the 
process of constituting an auspicious regime for the 
protection of the ozone layer was totally inconceivable.
However, initially most of these countries retained 
their positions as onlookers and observers (124), Especially 
India remained out of the whole issue until the time 
following the signing of the Montreal Protocol in 1987
(125) , They were inclined to think that industrialized 
countries had contributed significantly to the depletion of 
ozone, therefore, it was their responsibility to resort to 
necessary means in order to avert the impending threat. 
Thus, at Montreal, they were more preoccupied with 
maximum usage of CFCs for the longest possible period
(126) . However, during the negotiations concerning the 
aggregate revision of the Montreal Protocol's provisions, 
they understandably put the greatest emphasis on the 
availability of financial assistance and access to new 
technologies (127), The main reason for this was the fact 
that the acceleration of CFC phaseout would have loaded
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new economic burdens on their shoulders. The financial 
damage which these countries might have been obliged to 
endure would be in terms of increased costs of imports, of 
technology and of alternative chemicals.
Therefore, developing countries demanded a 
discrete multilateral fund which would finance increasing 
costs in order to enable them to comply with the control 
measures of the Montreal Protocol (128). The Montreal 
Protocol had failed to establish such a fund, thus, China, 
India and Brazil had refused to be members to the Protocol 
(129). As it was in the case of other issues, the 
industrialized countries proposed conflicting views with 
respect to the fund. Although some countries supported the 
opinion, the United States and the United Kingdom 
expressed their doubts on the issue (130). However, later 
these countries recognized the necessity of the fund for a 
final compromise. Consequently, the consensus was 
achieved for the establishment of a multilateral fund 
accounting for 160 million dollars and which could be 
raised by up to 80 million dollars during the three year 
period when more countries become parties to the Protocol 
(131). In other words, in addition to the previously given 
concessions to developing states, further facilities were
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endorsed by the industrialized countries for the sake of an 
efficient collaboration (see section 3.2).
This collaboration between North and South on the 
ozone issue was a promising phenomenon since it indicated 
that the North-South confrontation could be transcended. 
In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly had passed 
three resolutions calling for a New International Economic 
Order: the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, the Programme of Action on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(132). Article 30 of the Charter stated that "The 
environmental policies of all states should enhance and not 
adversely affect the present and future development 
potential of developing countries" (133). The Montreal 
Protocol's provisions were obviously in accordance with the 
above quoted statements of the Charter. The provisions 
adopted by the Montreal Protocol for the special treatment 
of developing countries and concessions demonstrated that 
the industrialized countries safeguarded the economic 
interests of these nations. Therefore, closing the 
North-South gap at least in the ozone issue should be 
considered as a major accomplishment.
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The ultimate result was an unprecedented 
cooperation in the face of an ecological threat. However, 
this does not mean that the multinational efforts and the 
previously mentioned treaties should be cited as perfect 
accomplishments. In effect, the Montreal Protocol was 
exposed to further criticism and assault to a certain extent 
by environmentalists or atmospheric scientists even after it 
was revised elaborately in London, "...reducing these ozone 
losses will require tighter limits on the emissions of 
chlorine-containing compounds than those contained in the 
Montreal Protocol, amended in London only last year" (134). 
However, what can be claimed is that such a multinational 
reconciliation of divergent attributes and interests should 
be esteemed as an unprecedented phenomenon in the 
history of global environmental politics. Even more 
significant is the fact that this cooperation was not 
established for an immediate threat but to avert estimated 
future impacts and dangers of an environmental problem 
which still lacks perfect scientific understanding. The 
Protocol may have shortcomings, and further controls can 
be necessary to eradicate the ozone problem, however, this 
does not have to overshadow the success of nations in 
working together against the deterioration of environment. 
Indeed, previous struggle and endeavour have also been
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promoted by world states in issues relating to the 
destruction of tropical forests, Antarctic minerals, acid rain, 
whaling, global warming, etc. However, in none of these 
issues cooperation could reach the extent of success 
achieved by the Montreal Protocol. The words of Mustafa 
Tolba, the executive secretary of UNEP, who has said that 
the Montreal Protocol was "the beginning of a new era of 
environmental statesmanship," (135) are significant in the 
sense that they reflect the innovative aspect of the Protocol. 
Also, evolution of the ozone issue into a global regime is 
recognized by Porter and Brown who say that "The 
agreement ultimately produced by the bargaining process 
now stands as perhaps the strongest and most effective 
international regime" (136). As implied in the quotation, it 
is undeniably true that bargaining and concessions won over 
the conflicts among the world states. They transcended 
their disagreements for the sake of a better common future.
We have started our discussion by presenting the 
theories which epitomize the tragic consequences of 
resource scarcities and environmental degradation. At this 
point, it will be convenient to remind the reader of the 
words of William Ophuls who says.
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"Without even the semblance of a world 
government, such problems depend for 
their solution on the good will and purely 
voluntary cooperation of nearly 170 
sovereign states-a prospect that does not 
inspire optimism..." (137)
The evolution of the ozone problem which is a very 
recent issue puts future validity of such arguments into 
question. If cooperation was that much impossible how were 
the performers of international action able to evolve the 
issue into a path where different interests of many 
sovereign states converged? One of the major factors that 
contribute to this is the recent developments in scientific 
understanding of deteriorating ecological conditions. 
Scientific knowledge urges people to recognize the 
interconnectedness of smaller systems within the 
international ecosystem or biosphere (138). The reciprocal 
functional relationships between these systems nourish the 
life on our planet, and a rupture between them disturbs the 
ecological balance. Therefore, many of the environmental 
problems affect one another as for instance in the case of 
ozone depletion and global warming (see sect. 2.3). 
Furthermore, cumulative stress put on the environment has 
serious impacts and costs on human life. Consequently such
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realizations and the impossibility to avert the environmental 
afflictions by unilateral action has compelled sovereing 
states to take multilateral precautions, and this trend is 
likely to continue in the future.
However, it is questionable whether national 
interests and economic cost calculations are not involved in 
such issues. Obviously, it is impossible to underestimate 
their role in environmental politics. In many environmental 
issues national interests of sovereign states overweighed 
their willingness to regulate harmful human activities. In 
fact, the conflicts and discrepancies regarding the ozone 
issue have been introduced in this study in order to show 
that even the most successful cooperation up to this time is 
not without its limitations. In spite of this, what the 
Montreal Protocol demonstrated is that cooperation is still 
possible in the face of conflicting national interests and this 
cooperation could be improved in time. It took sixteen years 
to establish an auspicious regime on ozone and there may 
still be more to do. These sixteen years passed with the 
struggle to lessen the costs or stakes of cooperation for 
each participant through harsh bargaining and inevitable 
concessions. However, the result showed that although the 
road to multinational concensus is long and troublesome.
66
conflicts and national interests can be transcended. In other 
words, state power and interests are not always 
indestructible impediments as some scholars argue.
"The clear danger is that, instead of promoting world 
cooperation, ecological scarcity will simply intensify the 
Hobbesian war of all against all and cause armed peace to be 
replaced by overt international strife" (139). These are again 
the words of William Ophuls who has projected a future full 
of unresolvable conflicts and wars. It is a reality that states 
have different internal political and economic forces that 
shape their external policies in international environmental 
issues. But, this does not necessarily lead sovereign states to 
warfare. In this world order where power blocs are 
demolished, the threat of nuclear war is mitigated and 
economic interests are intermingled, the concept of 
security has also been posed to an alteration. A novel 
security conception called 'common security' challenges the 
conventional approach based on military and political 
power. According to this approach, no single state can be 
able to strengthen its security without increasing the 
security of other states (140). In other words, national 
security is affiliated with global security. Under these 
conditions, any state with the aim of achieving security
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within its borders has to envisage the security of the whole 
world. Also, this view disagrees with the conventional 
security approach which regards resource scarcity as one of 
the basic factors leading to international war. The 
conventional approach to security holds that states should 
compete in order to control the resources of the world by 
strengthening their military power (141). However, the 
common security approach claims that resource scarcities 
and environmental degradation prevail as a result of abuse of 
nature and mismanagement of the resource itself (142). 
Therefore, instead of competition, this view proposes the 
protection of the environment and fair management of 
resources through international cooperation. Although this 
concept of security has emerged recently, in early 1980s, 
there is enough hope for expecting a significant shift 
towards this direction in environmental problems. 
Obviously, the Montreal Protocol and the regime established 
on the ozone issue are the major indicators of such a future 
orientation.
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5. What type of cooperation?
Different approaches concerning international 
environmental politics can be categorized into two groups: 
realist (interest-based) approach and liberal institutionalist 
approach (143). Which of these approaches better describes 
the cooperation achieved in ozone depletion?
In its explanation the realist or interest-based 
approach attaches the greatest importance to state power 
and interests. It holds that internal political and economic 
forces urge sovereign states to adopt external policies that 
reflect their domestic interests. In this way, whether states 
choose or fail to cooperate is determined by their internal 
characteristics and benefits. Therefore, according to this 
view, state power is still the surpassing factor that fashions 
cooperation in international relations (144),
However, liberal-institutionalist theories emphasize 
the role of knowledge, international institutions, epistemic 
coommunities and societal and transnational actors in 
cooperation. In other words, this view to a certain extent 
deemphasizes the role of state power and interests in 
international environmental cooperation, or gives secondary 
importance to them (145).
69
Unit-level explanations refer to elements 
located at the national or subnational 
levels, whereas systemic explanations 
suggest that differences at the unit level 
produce less variation of outcomes.. While 
unit-level explanations emphasize the 
varying characteristics of countries, 
systemic theories suggest that countries 
with different internal characteristics 
tend to behave in the same way if they 
are sim ilarly positioned in the 
international system (146).
According to the above description we can say that 
the realist or interest based approach presents a unit-level 
explanation, and the institutionalist approach prefers a 
systemic explanation. While realists emphasize the 
divergent attributes of different nations, institutionalists 
claim that common knowledge, international institutions 
and transnational actors may shape the behaviours of 
sovereign states and can orientate them towards 
cooperation. However, here a misunderstanding should be 
avoided: the realist theories do not regard environmental 
cooperation as an unattainable fact. Indeed, what detaches 
the two approaches from each other is not the question of 
whether or not cooperation is possible, but it is the
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explanation of cooperation or by what means and under 
which conditions cooperation can or cannot be achieved.
With respect to ozone depletion scientific 
knowledge, international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, public concern and citizen activities played as 
significant roles in the issue as state power and interests 
did.
Cooperative efforts in order to obtain scientific 
evidence and to build a scientific consensus on the ozone 
issue have in no way failed. Knowledge in this field 
improved as a result of collaboration between the scientists 
from different states. Close cooperation between 
policy-makers and scientists also enhanced the success of 
the international actions against ozone depletion (147).
The approaches of international institutions to the 
issue were also crucial for the ozone regime. This critical 
role was successfuly played by UNEP which struggled to 
organize and mobilize the activities towards an auspicious 
path leading to a final cooperation. "...UNEP went far beyond 
a traditional secretariat function: it was a model for effective 
multilateral action" (148).
Nongovernmental organizations (environmentalist) 
and public pressure also did make considerable impact on
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the orientation of ozone policies in different countries 
(149). Nongovernmental organizations mobilized the 
citizens and lobbied governments towards taking strong 
action to protect the ozone layer. The environmentalist 
groups and citizens were activated against the depletion of 
the ozone layer initially in the United States (Friends of the 
Earth, the Sierra Club, etc.) (150). Through campaigns and 
by generating media interest in ozone depletion they put 
pressure on the U.S. government. Also, during the 
negotiations on ozone, many nongovernmental organizations 
attended the meetings and offered their opinions to the 
policy-m akers (151). The contributions of such 
organizations and public pressure were also apparently 
influential on the European Community. Jachtenfuchs points 
out the considerable effect of lobbying groups and public 
concern when he says, "It was the pressure of their 
respective national public opinion which has finally pushed 
the negotiators to forward-looking behaviour" (152). Also, 
the efforts of non-governmental organizations especially 
increased once the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987 
(153).
Doubtlessly states were the major international 
actors contributing to the evolution of the issue. However,
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their contribution was not always supporting the 
establishment of an appropriate ozone regime as it was in 
the case of international institutions, nongovernmental 
organizations (environmentalist) and citizen activities (see 
section 4).
Therefore, when all these above mentioned factors 
are considered, it can be seen that all of them function as 
components of a whole. In other words, international 
environmental cooperation is not possible without states' 
concurrence: nevertheless, this factor is not adequate for a 
final consensus. Something more than national 
acquiescence-scientific knowledge, institutional and public 
contributions, etc,-is essential for creating auspicious 
regimes on ecological problems.
However, at this point effectiveness of such regimes 
can be a point of concern. It might be possible to establish 
an appropriate regime with collaborative efforts, but shall 
we be able to attain effective outcomes from this 
cooperation? The answer of this question is apparently 
connected with the appropriate, influential and continuous 
implementation of compliance mechanisms. This aspect of 
the subject remains outside of the frames of this study. 
Effective compliance mechanisms play undeniably crucial
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roles in success of international cooperations; however, it is 
not the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the Montreal Protocol. It has been only two and a half years 
since the Protocol was signed in its revised form, and it 
would require further research to assess the d3oiamics of its 
compliance mechanisms.
Thus, as a final word it can be said that both realist 
and institutionalist approaches contribute to the 
understanding of cooperation obtained on the ozone issue. 
Neither state power and interests, nor scientific, 
institutional and transnational efforts can be ignored. 
Therefore, it can be concluded by emphasizing the 
complementarity of the two approaches in international 
environmental politics.
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6. Conclusion:
The ozone depletion problem as a case study has 
demonstrated that the structure of international 
environmental cooperation has been changing. The ozone 
issue displays that national and economic conflicts can be 
eliminated to a great extent for the salvation of life on the 
planet. Thus, we can say that global ecological threats that 
are impossible to avert by unilateral action have orientated 
states towards cooperation-at least in the case of ozone 
depletion. In this case, the strongest and most efficient 
international environmental regime has been established.
The global consensus established as a result of the 
Montreal Protocol can be the premise of future cooperation 
among the performers of international action. Other 
environmental concerns including global warming, 
endangered species, acid rain. Antarctic minerals, land 
desertification, destruction of tropical forests, etc., can be 
addressed by drawing lessons from the ozone issue. 
Although it would be too extravagant to expect immediate 
cooperation and solutions for environmental problems, 
there is no reason to be pessimistic since the ozone issue 
has already opened the doors for future hopes.
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Appendix A
Vieiuia Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer, March 1985
Preamble
The Parties to this Convention,
Aware o f the potentially harmful impact on human health and the environment 
through modification o f the ozone layer.
Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations Confer­
ence on the Human Environment, and in particalar principle 21, which provides 
that '"States have, in accordance with the Chaner o f the United Nations and the 
principies o f international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the en­
vironment o f other States or o f areas beyond the limits o f national jurisciiction,"
Taking into account the droimstances and particular requirements of developing 
countries.
Mindful o f the work and studies proceeding within both international and na­
tional organizations and, in particular, of the World Plan of Action on the Ozone 
Layer o f the United Nations Environment Programme,
Mindful also o f the precautionary measures for the protection of the ozone layer 
which have already been taken at the national and international levels.
Aware that measures to protect ± e  ozone layer from modifications due to human 
activities require international co-operation and action, and should be based on 
relevant scientific and technical considerations.
Aware also o f the need for further research and systematic observations to further 
develop scientific knowledge of the ozone layer and possible adverse effects result­
ing from its modification.
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Determined to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects 
resulting from modifications o f the ozone layer.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS!
Article 1. DeSnitions
For the purposes o f this Convention:
1. 'The ozone layer" means the layer o f atmospheric ozone above the planetar/ 
boundar/ layer.
2. "Adverse effects" means changes in the physical environment or biota, in­
cluding changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects on human 
health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of natural and managed 
ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind.
3. "Alternative technologies or equipment" means technologies or equipment 
the use of which makes it possible to reduce or effectively eliminate emissions of 
substances which have or are likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer.
4. "Alternative substances" means substances which reduce, eliminate or avoid 
adverse effects on the ozone layer.
5. "Parties" means, unless the te.xt other/vdse indicates. Parties to this Conven­
tion.
6. "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization consti­
tuted by sovereign States o f a given region which has competence in respect of 
matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly autho­
rized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or 
accede to the instruments concerned.
7. "Protocols" means protocols to this Convention.
Articie 2. General Obligations
1. The Parries shall take appropriate measures in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention and o f those protocols in force to which they are party to pro­
tea human health and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely 
to result from human acrivities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone 
layer.
2. To this end the Parries shall, in accordance t-vith ± e  means at their disposal 
and their capabilities:
(a) Co-operate by means o f systematic observations, research and imorma- 
tion exchange in order to better understand and assess the effects o f hu­
man acrivities on the ozone layer and the effects on human health and 
the environment from modification of the ozone layer;
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(b) Adopt appropriate legislative or adiiiinistraave measures and co-operate 
in harmonizing appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent 
human acrivities under their jurisdiction or control should it be found 
that these acrivities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting 
from modiffcation or likely modification of the ozone layer;
(c) Co-operate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and stan­
dards for the implementation of this Convention, with a view to the 
adoption of protocols and annexes;
(d) Co-operate with competent intemationai bodies to implement effecrively 
this Convention and protocols to which they are parr/.
3. The provisions o f this Convention shall in no way affea the right of Parries to 
adopt, in accordance 'with intemationai law, domestic measures additional to 
those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, nor shall they affea additional 
domestic measures already taken by a Party, provided that these measures are not 
incompatible with their obligations under this Convention.
4. The application o f this arride shall be based on relevant scentific and techni­
cal considerations.
AjTicie 3. Research and Systematic Observations
1. The Parties undertake, as appropriate, to initiate and co-operate in, directly 
or through competent intemarional bodies, the ccndua of research and scenrific 
assessments on;
(a) The physical and chemical processes that may affea the ozone layer;
(b) The human health and other biological effects deriving from any modifi­
cations o f the ozone layer, parrioilariy those resulting from changes in ultra-violet 
solar radiation having biological effects (UV-3);
(c) Climatic effec;^ deriving from any modifications o f the ozone layer;
(d) Effects deriving from any modifications of the ozone layer and any con­
sequent change in UV-3 radiation on natural and synthetic materials useful to 
mankind;
(e) Substances, practices, processes and activities that may affea the ozone 
layer, and their oimulative effects;
(f) Alternative substances and technologies;
(g) Related socio-economic maners;
and as further elaborated in anne.xes I and IL
2. The Parties undertake to promote or establish, as appropriate, direoly or 
through competent intemationai bodies and taking fiiily into account national 
legislation and relevant ongoing activities at both the national and international 
levels, joint or complementar/ programmes for systematic obser/ation of the state 
of the ozone layer and other relevant parameters, as elaborated in anne.x L
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3. The Parries undertake to co-operate, directly or through competent inter­
national bodies, in ensuring the collecrion, validation and transmission of re­
search and observational data through appropriate world data centres in a regular 
and timely fashion.
Article 4. Co-operation in the Legal, Scientific and 
Technical Fields
1. The Parties shall facilitate and encourage the exchange of sdenticc, technical, 
sodo-economic, commerdal and legal information relevant to this Convention as 
further elaborated in annex ЕГ. Such information shall be supplied to bodies 
agreed upon by the Parties. Any such body recerring information regarded as con­
fidential by the supplying Parry shall ensure that such imormation is not disdosed 
and shall aggregate it to protect its conndentiality before it is made available to аД 
Parties.
2. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, regulations 
and practices and taking into account in partioilar the needs of me de'/eloping 
countries, in promoting, directly or through competent intemationai bodies, the 
development and transfer of technology and knowledge. Such co-operation shaH 
be carried out particjiarly through:
(a) Fadlicaiion of the acquisition of alternative technologies by other Parties;
(b) Provision of information on alternative technologies and equipment, and 
supply of spedai manuals or guides to them;
(c) The supply of necessary equipment and fadliries for research and system­
atic obser/ations;
(d) Appropriate training of sdentific and technical personnel.
Article 3. Transmission of Information
The Parties shall transmit, through the secretariat, to the Conference of the Parties 
established under artide 6 information on the measures adopted by them in im­
plementation of this Convention and of protocols to which they are party in such 
form and at such intervals as the meetings of the parties to the relevant instru­
ments may determine.
Article 6. Comerence of the Parties
1. A  Conference of the Parties is hereby established. The first meeting o f the 
Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the secretariat designated on an 
interim basis under artide 7 not later than one year after entry into force of this 
Convention. Thereafter, ordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties shaH 
be held at regular intervals to be determined by the Conference at its first meeting.
2. Extraordinary meetings o f the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such 
other times as mav be deemed necessarv bv the Conference, or at the ^vritten
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request o f any party, provided that, within six months of the request being com­
municated to them by the secretariat, it is supponed by at least one third o f the 
Parties.
3. The Conference o f the Parties shall by consensus agree upon and adopt rules 
o f procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies it may 
establish, as well as financial provisions governing the functioning o f the secre­
tariat.
4. The Conference o f the Parties shall keep under continuous review the imple­
mentation o f this Convention, and, in addition, shall:
(a) Establish the form and the intervals for transmitting the information to be 
submitted in accordance with artide 5 and consider such information as well as 
reports submitted by any subsidiary body;
(b) Review ± e  sdentific information on the ozone layer, on its possible mod­
ification and on possible effects o f any such modification;
(c) Promote, in accordance vdth artide 2, the harmonization o f appropriate 
polices, strategies and measures for minimizing the release of substances causing 
or likely to cause modification o f ± e  ozone layer, and make recommendations on 
any other measures relating to this Convention;
(d) Adopt, in accordance with artides 3 and 4, programmes for research, 
systematic observations, sdentific and technological co-operation, the exchange 
of information and the transfer o f technology and knowledge:
■ (e) Consider and adopt, as required, in accordance with artides 9 and 10, 
amendments to this Convention and its anne.xes;
(f) Consider amendments to any protocol, as well as to any annexes thereto, 
and, if so deeded, recommend their adoption to the parties to the protocol con­
cerned;
(g) Consider and adept, as required, in accordance with artide 10, additional 
annexes to this Convention;
(h) Consider and adopt, as required, protocols in accordance with artide 3;
(i) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the imple­
mentation o f this Convention;
(j) Seek, where appropriate, the services o f competent international bodies 
and sdentific committees, in particular the World Meteorological Organization 
and the World Health Organization, as well as the Co-ordinating Committee on 
the Ozone Layer, in sdentific research, systematic observations and other activities 
pertinent to the objectives o f this Convention, and make use as appropriate of 
information 15:от these boidies and committees;
(k) Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for 
the achievement o f the purposes o f this Convention.
5. The United Nations, its spedalized agendcs and the International Atomic En­
ergy Agency, as well as any State not party to this Convention, may be represented
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at meetings o f the Conference of the Parties by obser/ers. Any body or agency, 
whether national or international, governmental or non-govemmentaJ. qualified 
in fields relating to the protecnon o f the ozone layer which has informed the sec­
retariat o f its wish to be represented at a meeting o f the Conference of the Parties 
as an obser/er may be admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present 
objecL The admission and participation of obser/ers shail be subjea to the rules of 
procedure adopted by the Conference o f the Parties.
Article 7. Secretariat
1. The functions of the secretariat shall be:
(a) To arrange for and ser/ice meetings provided for in artides 6. S, 9 and 10;
(b) To prepare and transmit reports based upon information received in ac­
cordance with artides 4 and 5. as well as upon information derived horn 
meetings o f subsidiary bodies established under artide 6;
(c) To perform the functions assigned to it by any protocols;
(d) To prepare reports on its activities carried out in implementation of its 
functions under this Convention and present them to the Conference of 
the Parties;
(e) To ensure the necessary co-ordination with other relevant international 
bodies, and in particular to enter into such admiiiistrative and contractual 
arrangements as may be required for ± e  effective discharge of its func­
tions;
(f) To perform such other functions as may be determined by the Conference 
o f the Parties.
2. The secretariat functions will be carried out on an interim basis by the United 
Nations Environment Programme until the completion of the first ordinary meet­
ing o f the Conference of the Parties held pursuant to artide 6. At its first ordinary 
meeting, the Conference o f the Parties shail designate the secretariat from 
amongst those existing competent international organizations which have signi­
fied their willingness to carry out the secretariat functions under this Convention.
Article 8. Adoption of Protocols
1. The Conference of the Parties may at a meeting adopt protocols pursuant to 
artide 2.
2. The text o f any proposed protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by 
the secretariat at least six months before such a meeting.
Artide 9. Amendment of the Convention or Protocols
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Convention or to any protocol. 
Such amendments shall take due account, imer alia, o f relevant sdentinc and 
technical considerations.
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2. Amendmenis to this Conventicn shall be adopted at a meenng of the Confer­
ence o f the Parties. Amendments to any protocol shall be adopted at a meeting of 
the Parties to the protocol in question. The text o f any proposed amendment to 
this Convention or to any protocol, except as may otherwise be provided in such 
protocol, shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least sLx 
months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat 
shall also communicate proposed amendments to ± e  signatories to this Conven­
tion for information.
3. The Parties shall make e/ery effon to reach agreement on any proposed 
amendment to this Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been 
exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be 
adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the 
meeting, and shall be submiued by the Depositary to all Parties for ratification, 
approval or acceptance.
4. The procedure mentioned in paragraph 3 above shall apply to amendments 
to any protocol, except that a two-thirds majority o f the parties to that protocol 
present and voting at the meeting shall sufdce for their adoption.
5. Ratification, approval or acceptance of amendments shall be notified to the 
Depositary in writing. Amendments adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 
above shall enter into force berween parties having accepted them on the nine- 
tietii day 'after the receipt by the Depositary o f notification of their ratification, 
approval or acceptance by at least three-fourths of the Parties to this Convention 
or by at least two-thirds o f the parties to the protocol concerned, except as may 
otherwise be provided in such protocol. Thereafter the amendments shall enter 
into force for any other Party on the ninetierh day after that Party deposits its 
instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance of the amendments.
6. For the purposes : f  chis article. "Tarties present and voting" means Parties 
present and casting an afiinnative or negative vote.
Article 10. Adoption and Amendment of Annexes
1. The annexes to this Convention or to any protocol shall form an integral pan 
of this Convention or o f such protocol, as the case may be, and, unless expressly 
provided other/rise, a reference to this Convention or its protocols constimtes at 
the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restriaed 
to scientific, technical and administrative matters.
2. Except as may be othenvise provided in any protocol with respea to its an­
nexes, the foilo^ving procedure shall apply to the proposal, adoption and entr/ 
into force of additional annexes to this Convention or of annexes to a protocol:
(a) Anne.xes to this Convention shall be proposed and adopted according to 
the procedure laid down in article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3, while annexes to any
82
protocol shall be proposed and adopted according to the procedure laid down in 
ariide 9, paragraphs 2 and 4;
(b) Any parr/ that is unable to approve an additional annex to this Conven­
tion or an annex to any protocol to which it is parry shall so notify the Depositary, 
in ^ vriting, within six months from the date o f the communication of the adoption 
by the Depositary. The Depositary shah without delay notify all Parties o f any such 
notification received. A  Party may at any time substitute an acceptance for a pre­
vious declaration of objection and the annexes shall thereupon enter into force for 
that Party;
(c) On the expiry of six months from the date of the circulation o f the com­
munication by the Depositary, the annex shad become effective for ail Parties to 
this Convention or to any protocol concerned which have not submitted a notifi­
cation in accordance with the provision of subparagraph (b) above.
3. The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to 
this Convention or to any protocol shall be subject to the same procedure as for 
the proposal, adoption and entry into force of annexes to the Convention or an­
nexes to a protocol. Annexes and amendments thereto shall take due account. 
inter alia, of relevant scentific and technical considerations.
4. If an additional aimex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment 
to this Convention or to any protocol, the additional annex or amended annex 
shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to this Convention or 
to the protocol concerned enters into force.
Artide 11. Settlement of Disputes
1. In the event of a dispute ber -^veen Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention, the parties concerned shaH seek solution by nego­
tiation.
2. If the parties concerned caimoc reach agreement by negotiation, they may 
jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third parry.
3. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, or at 
any time ffiereafter, a State or regional economic integration organization may 
declare in writing to the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in accordance 
with paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or both of the following 
means o f dispute settlement as compulsory:
(a) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Confer­
ence o f the Parties at its first ordinary meeting;
(b) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
4. If  the parties have not, in accordance with paragraph 3 above, accepted the 
same or any procedure, the dispute shall be submitted to conciliation in accor­
dance with paragraph 5 below unless the parties othenvise agree.
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5. A  conciliation colitiiiission shall be created upon the request o f one of the 
parties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of 
members appointed by each party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by 
the members appointed by each party. The commission shall render a final and 
recommendatory award, which the parties shah consider in good faith.
6. The provisions o f this articie shall apply with respea to any protocol except 
as otherwise provided in the protocol concerned.
Article 12· Signature
This Convention shall be open for signature at die Federal Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs o f the Republic o f Austria in Vienna from 22 March 1985 to 21 September 
1985, and at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 22 September 1985 
to 21 xMarch 1986.
Anide 13. Ratification, Accentance or ADorovai
1. This Convention and any protocol shall be subject to ratincation, acceptance 
or approval by States and by regional economic integration organizations. Instru­
ments o f ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Deposi- 
lary.
2. Any organization referred to in paragraph 1 above which becomes a Party to 
this Convention or any protocol without any of its member States being a Party 
shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention or the protocol as the 
case may be. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member 
States is a Party to the Convention or relevant protocol, the organization and its 
member States shaH decide on their respecnve responsibilities for ± e  penormance 
o f their obligation under the Convention or protocol, as the case may be. In such 
cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exerdse 
rights under the Convention or relevant protocol conairrently.
3. In their instruments o f ratification, acceptance or approval, the organizations 
referred to in paragraph 1 above shall declare the extent of their competence with 
respea to the maiteis governed by the Convention or the relevant protocol. These 
organizations shall also inform the Depositary o f any substantial modification in 
the extent o f their competence.
Anide 14. Accession
1. This Convention and any protocol shall be open for accession by States and 
by regional economic integration organizations from the date on which the Con­
vention or the protocol concerned is closed for signature. The instruments of 
accession shafi be deposited with the Depositary.
. 2. In their instruments o f accession, ± e  organizations referred to in paragraph 1 
above shall declare the extent of their competence with respea to the maners
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; governed by the Convention or the relevant protocol. These organizations shafl 
also imonn the Depositary o f any substantial modincation in the extent o f their 
competence.
3. The provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, shall apply ю regional economic 
integration organizations which accede to this Convention or any protocol.
Axricle 15. Right to Vote
1. Each Party to this Convention or to any protocol shall have one vote.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 1 above, regional economic integration 
organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exerdse their right to vote 
with a number o f votes equal to the number of their member States which are 
Parties to the Convention or the relevant protocol. Such organizations shall not 
exercise ± e ir  right to vote if their member States exercise theirs, and ’/ice versa.
Article 16. Relationship between the Convention and Its Protocols
1. A  State or a regional economic integration organization may not become a 
party to a protocol unless it is, or becomes at the same time, a Party to the Conven­
tion.
2. Decisions concerning any protocol shah be taken only by the parties to ± e  
protocol concerned.
* Article 17. Entry into Force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of 
deposit of the twentiedi mstmment of ratmcation, acceptance, approval or acces­
sion.
2. Any protocol, except as otherwise provided in such protocol, shall enter into 
force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit o f the eleventh insmiment of 
ratif cation, acceptance or approval of such protocol or accession thereto.
3. For each Party which ratifies, accepts or approves this Convention or accedes 
thereto after the deposit of the twentieth mstniment of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, it shafi enter into force on the ninetiedi day after the date 
o f deposit by such Party o f its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.
4. Any protocol, except as othenvise provided in such protocol, shall enter into 
force for a party that ratifies, accepts or approves that protocol or accedes thereto 
after its entry into force pursuant to paragraph 2 above, on the ninetie± day after 
the date on which that party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, or on ± e  date on which the Convention enters into force 
for that Рапу, whichever shall be the later.
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5. For the purposes o f paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to 
those deposited by member States o f such organization.
Anicle 18. Reservations
No reservations mav be made to this Convention.
Article 19. Withdrawal
1. At any time after four years from the date on which this Convention has 
entered into force for a Pany that Party may withdraw from the Convention by 
giving ^ vrinen notification to ± e  Depositary'.
2. Except as may be provided in any protocol at any time after four years from 
the date on which such protocol has entered into force for a parry, that parry may 
withdraw from the protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
3. Any such withdrawal shaft take effea upon expiry of one year after the date 
o f its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as maybe specified in the 
notification o f the withdrawal.
4. Any Party which vsdthdraws from this Convention shaft be considered as also 
having withdrawn from any protocol to which it is parry.
Arride 20. Depositary
1. The Secretary-General o f the United Nations shaft assume ± e  functions of 
depositary o f this Convention and any protocols.
2. The Depositary shaft inform the Parties, in parucilar, of:
(a) The signature o f this Convention and of any protocol, and the deposit of 
instruments o f ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in accor­
dance with articles 13 and 14;
The date on which the Convention and any protocol will come into force 
in accordance with article 17;
Notifications o f wi±drawal made in accordance with article 19; 
Amendments adopted with respea to the Convention and any protocol 
their acceptance by the parties and their date of entry into force in accor­
dance with article 9;
Aft communications relating to the adoption and approval o f annexes 
and to the amendment o f annexes in accordance with article 10; 
Notifications by regional economic integration organizations of tiie extent 
o f their competence with respea to matters governed by this Convention 
and any protocols, and o f any modifications thereof.
(g) Declarations made in accordance with article 11, paragraph 3.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
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Article 21. Authentic Texts
The original of this Convention, o f which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
Secretap/-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undcTsigned, being duly authorized to that e fea , have 
signed this Convention.
DONE at Vienna on the 22nd day of March 1985.
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Appendix B
Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
September 1987
Preamble
The Parries to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection o f the Ozone Layer,
Mindful o f their obligation under that Convention to take appropriate measures to 
protea human health and ± e  environment against adverse effects resulting or 
likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the 
ozone layer.
Recognizing that world-wide emissions of cenain substances can signifîcanüy de­
plete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in 
adverse effects on human health and the environment.
Conscious o f the potential climatic effects of emissions of these substances.
Aware that measures taken to protea the ozone layer from depletion should be 
based on relevant scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and eco­
nomic considerations.
Determined to protea the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control 
equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate 
objective o f their elimination on the basis o f developments in scientific knowl­
edge, taking into account technical and economic considerations.
Acknowledging that spedal provision is required to meet the needs o f de^/eloping 
countries for these substances.
Noting the precautionary measures for controlling emissions o f cenain chlorofluo- 
rocarbons that have already been taken at national and regional levels.
Considering the importance o f promoting international co-operation in the re­
search and development o f science and technology relating to the control and
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reduction of emissions o f substances that deplete the ozone layer, bearing in m in d 
in particular the needs o f developing countries,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article 1. Definitions
For the purposes o f this Protocol:
1. "Convention" means the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, adopted on 22 March 1985.
2. "Parties" means, unless the text otherwise indicates. Parties to this Protocol.
3. "Secretariat" means the secretariat of the Convention.
4. "Controlled substance" means a substance listed in Annex A  to this Protocol, 
whether existing alone or in a rmxmre. It excludes, however, any such substance 
or mixture which is in a manufactured product other than a container used for the 
transportation or storage of the substance listed.
5. 'Troduction" means the amoimt of controlled substances produced minus 
the amount destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties.
6. "Consumption" means production plus imports minus exports o f controlled 
substances.
7. "Caicwilated levels" o f production, imports, exports and consumption means 
levels determined in accordance with Article 3.
8. 'Industrial rationalization" means the transfer o f all or a portion of the cal­
culated level o f production o f one Party to another, for the pmpose of achie’/ing 
economic effidendes or responding to antidpated shortfalls in supply as a result 
of plant dosures.
Article 2. Control Measures
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on the 
first day of the seventh month following the date o f the entry into force of this 
Protocol, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level o f con­
sumption o f the controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not exceed its 
calculated level o f consumption in 1986. By the end of the same period, each 
Party producing one or more o f these substances shall ensure that its calculated 
level o f production o f the substances does not exceed its calailated level of pro­
duction in 1986, except that such level may have increased by no more than ten 
per cent based on the 1986 level Such increase shall be permined only so as to 
satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under Artide 5 and for the 
purposes o f industrial rationalization between Parties.
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2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on the 
first day o f the thirty-seventh month following the date of the entr/ into force of 
this Protocol and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of 
consumption of the controlled substances listed in Group П o f Annex A  does not 
exceed its calculated level o f consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or 
more of these substances shall ensure that its calcilated level of production of the 
substances does not exceed its calailated level o f production in 1986, except that 
such level may have increased by no more than ten per cent based on the 1986 
level. Such increase shall be permitted only so as to satisfy the basic domestic 
needs o f the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of industrial 
rationalization between Parties. The mechanisms for implementing these mea­
sures shall be decided by tiie Parties at their first meeting following the first scen- 
tinc review.
3. Each Parry shall ensure ± a t for the period 1 July 1993 to 30 June 1994 and 
in each twelve-montii period thereafter, its calcilaied le^ e^i o f consumption of tiie 
controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not exceed, annually, eighr/ per 
cent of its caloilated level of consumption m 1986. Each Party producing one or 
more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure ±a t its caloilated 
level o f production of the substances does not exceed, annually, eighty per cent of 
its calculated level of production in 1986. However, in order to satisfy the basic 
domestic needs o f the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of 
industrial rationalization berween Parties, its calailated level o f production may 
exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calcolated level o f production in 1986.
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999, and 
in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level of consumption of the 
controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not exceed, annually, fifty per 
cent of its calculated level o f consumption in 1986. Each Party producing one or 
more o f these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calcjlated 
level o f production of the substances does not exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its 
calcolated level o f production in 1986. Howe/er, in order to satisfy the basic do­
mestic needs of the Parties operating under Article 5 and for the purposes of in­
dustrial rationalization between Parties, its caloiiated level of production may ex­
ceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent o f its calcilaied level o f production m 
1986. This paragraph will apply unless the Parties decide otherwise at a meeting 
by a two-thirds majority o f Parties present and voting, representing at least two- 
thirds o f the total calculated level o f consumption of these substances of the Par­
ties. This decision shall be considered and made in the light o f the assessments 
referred to in Article 6.
5. Any Party whose calculated level o f production in 1986 o f the controlled 
substances in Group I o f Annex A  was less ±an  twenty-five kilotonnes may, for 
the purposes of industrial rationalization, transfer to or receive from any other 
Party, production in excess o f the limits set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 provided 
that the total combined calcilated Ic/el o f production o f the Parties concerned
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does not exceed ± e  producaon limits set out in this Article. Any transfer of such 
production shall be notined to the secretariat, no later than the time of the trans­
fer.
6. Any Party not operating under Article 5, that has facilities for the production 
o f controlled substances under construction, or contracted for, prior to 16 Septem­
ber 1987, and provided for in national legislation prior to 1 January 1987, may 
add the production from such facilities to its 1986 production of such substances 
for the purposes o f determining its calculated le^ /ei o f production for 1986, pro­
vided that such facilities are completed by 31 December 1990 and that such pro­
duction does not raise that Parry's armual calculated level o f consumption of the 
controlled substances above 0.5 kilograms per capita.
7. Any transfer o f production pursuant to paragraph 5 or any addition of pro­
duction pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be notified to the secretariat, no later than 
the time of the transfer or addition.
8. (a) Any Parties which are Member States o f a regional economic integration
organization as defined in Article 1 (6) of the Convention may agree that 
they shall jointly fulfil their obligations respecting consumption under 
this Article provided that their total combined calculated level of con­
sumption does not exceed the levels required by this Article.
(b) The Parties to any such agreement shall inform the secremriat of the 
terms o f the agreement before the date of the reduction in consumption 
with which the agreement is concerned.
(c) Such agreement will become operative only if all Member States of the 
regional economic integration organization and the organization con­
cerned are Parties to the Protocol and have notified the secretariat of their 
manner o f implementation.
9. (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6, the Parties may
decide whether: <
(i) adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials specified in Annex 
should be made and, if so. what the adjustments should be; and
(ii) further adjustments and reductions o f production or consumption of 
the controlled substances from 1986 levels should be undertaken 
and, if so, what the scope, amount and timing o f any such adjust­
ments and reductions should be.
(b) Proposals for such adjustments shafi be communicated to ± e  Parties by 
the secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Parties at 
which they are proposed for adoption.
(c) In taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to reach 
agreement by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, 
and no agreement reached, such decisions shall, as a last resort, be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting
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representing at least fifty per cent of the total consumption o f the con­
trolled substances o f the Parties.
(d) The decisions, which shall be binding on all Parties, shall forthwith be 
communicated to the Parties by the Depositary. Unless otherwise pro­
vided in the decisions, they shall enter into force on the expiry of six 
months from the date o f the drculation of the communication by the 
Depositary,
10. (a) Based on the assessments made pursuant to Article 6 o f this Protocol amd
in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9 of the Convention, 
the Parries may decide:
(i) whether any substances, and if so which, should be added to or re­
moved from any annex to this Protocol; and
(ii) the mechanism, scope and timing of the control measures that 
should apply to those substances;
(b) Any such decision shall become effective, provided that it has been ac­
cepted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parties present and voting.
11. Notwithstanding the provisions contained in this Article. Parties may takg 
more stringent measures tiian those required by this Article.
Article 3. Calculation of Control Levels
For the purposes of Articles 2 and 5, each Party shall, for each Group of substances 
in Annex A, determine its calculated levels of:
(a) production by:
(i) multiplying its annual production o f each controlled substance by 
the ozone depleting potential specified in respea of it in Annex A  
and
(ii) adding together, for each such Group, the resuiting figures;
(b) imports and exports, respectively, by following, muiatis mutandis, the pro­
cedure set out in subparagraph (a); and
(c) consumption by adding together its calculated levels of production and 
imports and subtracting its calculated level o f exports as determined in 
accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b ) . However, b e g in n in g on 1 
January 1993, any expon of controlled substances to non-Parties shafi 
not be subtracted in calculating the consumption level of the exporting 
Parr/.
Article 4· Control of Trade with Non-Parties
1. Within one year o f the entry into force of this Protocol, each Party shall ban 
the import o f controlled substances from any State not party to this Protocol.
2. Beginning on 1 January 1993, no Party operating under paragraph 1 o f Ar­
ticle 5 may expon any controlled substance to any State not party to this Protocol.
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3. Within three years o f the date o f the entry into force o f this Protocol the 
Parties shall, following the procedures in Article 10 o f the Convention, elaborate 
in an annex a list o f products containing controlled substances. Parties that have 
not objeaed to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within 
one year of the annex having become effective, the import o f those products from 
any State not party to this Protocol.
4. Within five years o f the entry into force of this Protocol, the Parties shall de­
termine the feasibility o f banning or restricting, from States not party to this Pro­
tocol, the impon of products produced with, but not containing, controlled sub­
stances. I f  determined feasible, the Parties shall, following the procedures' in 
Article 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an aimex a list of such products. Parties 
that have not objeaed to it in accordance with those procedures shall ban or re- 
stria, within one year o f the annex having become effective, the impon of those 
products from any State not party to this Protocol.
5. Each Party shall discourage the expon, to any State not party to this Protocol, 
of technology for producing and for utilizing controlled substances.
6. Each Party shall refrain from providing new subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees 
or insurance programmes for the export to States not party to this Protocol of 
products, equipment, plants or technology that would facfiitate the production of 
controlled substances.
7. Paragraphs 5 and 6 shafi not apply to products, equipment, plants or technol­
ogy that improve the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of controlled 
substances, promote the development of alternative substances, or otherwise con­
tribute to the reduction of emissions o f controlled substances.
8. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, imports referred to in para­
graphs 1, 3 and 4 may be permitted from any State not party to this Protocol if 
±a t State is determined, by a meeting of the Parties, to be in full compliance with 
Article 2 and this Article, and has submitted data to that effea as specified in 
Article 7.
Article 5. Special Situation of Developing Coimtries
1. Any Party that is a de^/eloping coimtry and whose annual calcilated level of 
consumption o f the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita on 
the date o f the entry into force of the Protocol for it, or any time thereafter within 
ten years o f the date of entry into force o f the Protocol shall, in order to meet its 
basic domestic needs, be entitled to delay its compliance with the control mea­
sures set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2 by ten years after that specified in 
those paragraphs. However, such Party shall not exceed an annual calculated level 
of consumption of 0.3 küograms per capita. Any such Party shall be entitled to use 
either the average of its annual calculated level o f consumption for the period 
1995 to 1997 inclusive or a calculated level o f consumption of 0.3 kilograms per
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capita, whichever is the lower, as the basis for its compliance with the control 
measures.
2. The Parties undertake to facilitate access to environmentally safe alternative 
substances and technology for Parties that are developing countries and assist 
them to make expeditious use o f such alternatives.
3. The Parties undertake to facilitate bilaterally or multilaterally the provision of 
subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes to Parties that are de­
veloping countries for the use o f alternative technology and for substitute prod­
ucts.
Article 6. Assessment and Re^/iew of Control Measures
Beginning in 1990, and at least every four years thereafter, the Parties shall assess 
the control measures provided for in Artide 2 on the basis of available sdentidc. 
environmental, technical and economic information. At least one year before 
each assessment, the Parties shall convene appropriate panels of experts qualified 
in the fields mentioned and determine the composition and terms o f reference of 
any such panels. Within one year o f being convened, the panels will repon their 
condusions, through the secretariat, to the Parties.
Article 7. Reporting of Data
1. Each Party shall provide to the secretariat, within three months of becoming 
a Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the con­
trolled substances for the year 1986, or the best possible estimates o f such dau 
where actual data are not available.
2. Each Party shall provide statistical data to the secretariat on its annual pro­
duction ('With separate data on amoxmts destroyed by technologies to be approved 
by the Parties), imports, and expons to Parties and non-Parties, respectively, of 
such substances for the year during whidi it becomes a Party and for each year 
thereafter. It shall forward the data no later than nine months after the end of the 
year to which the data relate.
Article 8. Non-Compliance
The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and in­
stitutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of 
this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance.
Article 9. Research, Development, Public Awareness and 
Exchange of Information
1. The Parties shall co-operate, consistent with their national laws, regulations 
and practices and taking into account in particular the needs of developing coun-
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tries, in promoting, directly or through competent international bodies, research” 
dr/elopment and exchange o f information on:
(a) best technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling or 
destruction of controlled substances or otherwise reducing their emis­
sions;
(b) possible alternatives to controlled substances, to products containing 
such substances, and to products manufactured with them; and
(c) costs and benefits o f relevant control strategies.
2. The Parties, individually, jointly or through competent international bodies, 
shall co-operate in promoting public awareness of the environmental effects o f the 
emissions of controlled substances and other substances that deplete the ozone 
layer.
3. Within two years o f the entiy into force of this Protocol and every two years 
thereafter, each Party shall submit to the secretariat a summary o f the activities it 
has conducted pursuant to this Aiticie.
Article 10. Technical Assistance
1. The Parties shall, in the context o f the provisions o f Artide 4 o f the Conven­
tion, and taking into account in particular the needs of developing countries, co­
operate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate partidpation in and imple­
mentation of this Protocol.
2. Any Party or Signatory to this Protocol may submit a request to the secretariat 
for technical assistance for the purposes of implementing or partidpating in the 
Protocol.
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall begin deliberations on the means of 
fulfilling ± e  obligations set out in Artide 9, and paragraphs 1 and 2 o f this Artide, 
induding the preparation o f workplans. Such workplans shall pay special atten­
tion to ± e  needs and circumstances of the de^/eloping countries. States and re­
gional economic integration organizations not party to the Protocol should be 
encouraged to partidpate in activities specified in such workplans.
Article 11. Meetings of the Parties
1. The Parties shall hold meetings at regular intervals. The secretariat shall con­
vene the first meeting o f the Parties not later than one year after the date o f the 
entry into force of this Protocol and in conjunction with a meeting o f the Confer­
ence o f the Parties to the Convention, if a meeting o f the latter is scheduled within 
that period.
2. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the Parties shall be held, unless the Parties 
otherwise dedde, ’in conjunction with meetings o f the Conference o f the Parties to
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the Convennon. Extraordinary meetings o f the Parties shall be held at sucdi other 
times as may be deemed necessary by a meeting of the Parties, or at the written 
request o f any Party provided that, within six months of such a request being 
communicated to them by the secretariat, it is supponed by at least one third of 
the Parties.
3. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall:
(a) adopt by consensus rules o f procedure for their meetings;
(b) adopt by consensus the financial rules referred to in paragraph 2 of Ar­
ticle 13;
(c) establish the panels and determine the terms of reference referred to in 
Article 6;
(d) consider and approve the procedures and instimtional mechanisms spec­
ified in Article 3; and
(e) begin preparation o f workplans pursuant to paragraph 3 o f Article 10.
4. The functions o f the meetings of the Parties shall be to:
(a) review the implementation of this Protocol;
(b) dedde on any adjustments or reductions referred to in paragraph 9 of 
Article 2;
(c) decide on any addition to, insertion in or removal from any annex of 
substances and on related control measures in accordance with para­
graph 10 of Article 2;
(d) establish, where necessary guidelines or procedures for reporting of in­
formation as provided for in Article 7 and paragraph 3 of Article 9;
(e) review requests for technical assistance submitted pursuant to paragraph 
2 o f Article 10;
(f) re^/iew reports prepared by the secretariat pursuant to subparagraph (c) 
o f Article 12;
(g) assess, in accordance with Article 6, the control measures provided for 
in Article 2;
(h) consider and adopt, as required, proposals for amendment o f this Proto­
col or any annex and for any new annex;
(i) consider and adopt the budget for implementing this Protocol; and
(j) consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for 
the achievement o f the purposes o f this Protocol.
5. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic En­
ergy Agency as well as any State not party to this Protocol, may be represented at 
meetings o f the Parties as observers. Any body or agency whether national or 
international, governmental or non-govemmental, qualified in fields relating to 
the protection of the ozone layer which has informed the secretariat o f its wish to
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be represented at a meeting of the Parties as an observer may be admitted unless 
at least one third of the Parties present objec. The admission and participation of 
observers shall be subjea to the rules of procedure adopted by the Parties.
Article 12. Secretariat
For the purposes o f this Protocol, the secretariat shall:
(a) arrange for and ser/ice meetings of the Parties as provided for in Article 
11;
(b) receive and make available, upon request by a Party, data provided pur­
suant to Article 7;
(c) prepare and distribute regularly to the Parties reports based on informa­
tion received pursuant to Articles 7 and 9;
(d) notify the Parties of any request for technical assistance received pursuant 
to Article 10 so as to facilitate the provision o f such assistance;
(e) encourage non-?arties to attend the meetings of the Parties as observers 
and to aa  in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol;
(f) provide, as appropriate, the information and requests referred to in sub- 
paragraphs (c) and (d) to such non-Party observers; and
(g) perform such other functions for the achievement of the purposes o f this 
Protocol as may be assigned to it by the Parties.
Article 13. Financial Provisions *
1. The funds required for the operation of this Protocol, including those for the 
functioning o f the secretariat related to this Protocol, shall be charged e.i:ciusiveiy 
against contributions from the Parties.
2. The Parties, at their first meeting, shall adopt by consensus financial rules for 
the operation o f this Protocol.
Anide 14. Relationship of This Protocol to the Convention
Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions o f the Convention 
relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol.
Anide 15. Signature
This Protocol shall be open for signature by States and by regional economic inte­
gration organizations in xMontreal on 16 September 1987. in Ottawa from 17 Sep­
tember 1987 to 16 January 1988. and at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York from 17 January 1988 to 15 September 1988.
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Article 16. Entry into Force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at least 
eleven instruments o f ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol or acces­
sion thereto have been deposited by States or regional economic integration or­
ganizations representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption 
of the controlled substances, and the provisions o f paragraph 1 o f Article 17 of the 
Convention have been fulfilled. In the event that these conditions have not been 
fulfilled by that date, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day fol­
lowing the date on which the conditions have been fulfilled. ·
2. For the purposes o f paragraph 1, any such instrument deposited by a regional 
economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those de­
posited by member States o f such organization.
3. After the entry into force of this Protocol, any State or regional economic 
integration organization shall become a Party to it on the ninetieth day following 
the date o f deposit o f its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or acces­
sion.
Article 17. Parties Joining after Entry into Force
Subjea to Article 5, any State or regional economic integration organization 
which becomes a Party to this Protocol after the date of its entry into force, shall 
fulfil forthwith ± e  sum o f the obligations under Article 2, as well as under Article
4. that apply at that date to the States and regional economic integration organi­
zations that became Parties on the date the Protocol entered into force.
Article 18. Reservations
No reservations may be made to this Protocol.
Article 19. Withdrawal
For the purposes o f this Protocol, the provisions of Article 19 of the Convention 
relating to withdrawal shall apply, except with respea to Parties referred to in 
paragraph 1 o f Article 5. Any such Party may withdraw from this Protocol by 
giving wrinen notification to the Depositar/ at any time after four years o f assum­
ing the obligations specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2. Any such with­
drawal shall take effea upon expiry o f one year after the date of its receipt by the 
Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of the 
withdrawal.
Article 20. Authentic Texts
The original o f this Protocol, o f which the Arabic. Chinese. English. French. Rus­
sian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
Secretarv-General o f the United Nations.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned, being duly authorized to that ¿ffea, 
have signed this protocol.
DONE at Montreal this sixteenth day o f September, one thousand nine hundred 
and eighty seven.
Annex A. Controlled Substances
Group Substance
Ozone-depleting
potential*
Group I
CFCl, (CFG 11) 1.0
C?,C1, (CFG 12) 1.0
CjFjCij (GFG 113) 0.3
(GFG 114) 1.0
CjFjCl (GFG 115) 0.6
Group n
CFjBrCl halon 1211 3.0
CF*Br halon 1301 10.0
C2FjBr, ' halon 2402 (to be determined)
a. Ozone-depleting potentials are estimates based on existing knowledge and will be re­
viewed and revised periodicaily.
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Appendix C
London Revisions 
to the Montreal Protocol, 
June 1990
Annex L Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer
The Second Meeting o f the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer decides, on the basis o f assessments made pursuant to 
An ide 6 o f the Protocol, to adopt adjustments and reductions of production and 
consumption of the controlled substances in Annex A  to the Protocol, as follows, 
with the understanding that:
(a) References in Artide 2 to ''this Artide" and throughout the Protocol to "Ar- 
tide 2 " shall be interpreted as references to Artides 2 ,2A and 2B;
(b) References throughout the Protocol to "paragraphs 1 to 4 o f Artide 2" shall 
be interpreted as references to Artides 2A  and 2B; and
(c) The reference in paragraph 5 o f ,Artide 2 to "paragraphs 1, 3 and 4" shall be 
interpreted as a reference to Artide 2A.
A. A rticle 2A: CFCs
Paragraph 1 of Artide 2 o f the Protocol shall become paragraph 1 of Artide 2A, 
which shall be entitled "Artide 2A: CFCs." Paragraphs 3 and 4 o f Artide 2 shall 
be replaced by the following paragraphs, which shall be numbered paragraphs 2 
to 6 o f Artide 2 A:
2. Each Parry shall ensure that for the period from 1 July 1991 to 31 Decem­
ber 1992 its calculated levels o f consumption and production of the controlled 
substances in Group I o f Annex A  do not exceed 150 per cent o f its calculated 
levels o f production and consumption of those substances in 1986; with effect
100
from 1 January 1993, the twelve-month control period for ±ese controlled sub­
stances shall run from 1 January to 31 December each year.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1995, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of the controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not 
exceed, annually, fifty per cent o f its calculated level of consumption in 1986. 
Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same peri­
ods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not 
exceed, annually, fifty per cent o f its calculated level of production in 1986. 
However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 o f Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed 
that limit by up to ten per cent o f its calculated level of production in 1986.
4. Each Parry shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1997, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not 
exceed, annually, fifteen per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1986. 
Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same peri­
ods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not 
exceed, annually, fifteen per cent of its· calculated Ic/el o f production in 1986. 
However, in order to satisfy ± e  basic domestic needs of the Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed 
±a t limit by up to ten per cent o f its calculated level of production in 1986.
5. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 2000. and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances in Group I o f Annex A  does not 
exceed zero. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for 
the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances 
does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Airicie 5, its calculated level of pro­
duction may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level o f 
production in 1986.
6. In 1992, the Parties will review the situation with the objective o f acceler­
ating the reduction schedule.
B. Article 2B: Hahns
Paragraph 2 o f Article 2 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by the following para­
graphs, which shall be numbered paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2B:
Arvide 2B: Hahns
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1992, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances in Group n of Annex A  does not 
exceed, annually, its calculated level of consumption in 1986. Each Party pro-
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ducng one or more of these substances shall, for the same periods, ensure that 
its calcjlated level o f production o f the substances does not exceed, annually, 
its calculated level of producrion in 1986. However, in order to satisfy ± e  basic 
domestic needs o f the Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5, its cal­
culated level of production may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its 
calculated level o f production in 1986.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1995, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated Ic/el 
o f consumption o f the controlled substances in Group n o f Annex A  does not 
exceed, annually, fifty per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1986. 
Each Parry producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same peri­
ods. ensure that its calculated level of production of the substances does not 
exceed, annually, fifty per. cent o f its calculated level o f production in 1986. 
However, in order to satisfv the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 of Article 5, its calculated level o f production may exceed 
that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of production in 1986. This 
paragraph wül apply save to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the Ic/ei 
o f production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy essential uses for 
which no adequate alternatives are available.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 2000, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of the controlled substances in Group H o f Annex A  does not 
exceed zero. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for 
the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of production o f the substances 
does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of 
the Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5, its calculated level o f pro­
duction may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent o f its calculated level of 
production in 1986. This paragraph will apply save to the extent that the Parties 
dedde to permit the level of production or consumption that is necessary to 
satisfy essential uses for which no adequate alternatives are available.
4. By 1 January 1993, the Parties shall adopt a decision identifying essential 
uses, if any, for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. Such decision 
shall be reviewed by the Parties at their subsequent meetings.
Annex n. Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer
Anide I. Amendment
A. Preambular Paragraphs
1. The 6 th preambular paragraph of the Protocol shall be replaced by the follow­
ing:
Determined to protea the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to con­
trol equitably total global emissions o f substances that deplete it, with the ulti-
102
mate objective o f their elimination on the basis o f developments in sdennfic 
knowledge, taking into accoimt technical and economic considerations and 
bearing in mind the de'/elopmental needs of developing countries,
2. The 7th preambular paragraph of the Protocol shall be replaced by the follow­
ing:
Acknowledging that special provision is required to meet the needs of developing 
countries, including the provision of additional financial resources and access 
to relevant technologies, bearing in mind that the magnitude of funds necessary’ 
is predictable, and the funds can be expeaed to make a substantial difference in 
the world's ability to address the scentificaily established problem of ozone de­
pletion and its harmful effects,
3. The 9th preambular paragraph of the Protocol shall be replaced by the follow­
ing:
Considering the importance of promoting international co-operation in the re­
search, development and transfer of alternative technologies relating to the con­
trol and reduction of emissions o f substances that deplete the ozone layer, bear­
ing in mind in particular the needs of developing countries,
B, Article 1. Definitions
1. Paragraph 4 o f Article 1 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by tiie following 
paragraph:
4. "Controlled substance" means a substance in Annex A or in Annex B to 
this Protocol, w he±er existing alone or in a mixture. It includes the isomers of 
any such substance, except as spediied in the relevant Annex, but excludes any 
controlled substance or mixture which is in a manufactured produa other than 
a container used for ± e  transportation or storage of that substance.
2. Paragraph 5 o f Article 1 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by the following 
paragraph:
5. "Production" means the amount of controlled substances produced, minus 
the amotmt destroyed by technologies to be approved by the Parties and minus 
the amount entirely used as feedstock in the manufacrure of other chemicals. 
The amount recycled and reused is not to be considered as "production."
3. The following paragraph shall be added to Article 1. o f die Protocol:
9. "Transitional substance" means a substance in Annex C to this Protocol, 
whether existing alone or in a mixture. It includes the isomers of any such sub­
stance, except as may be specified in Annex C, but. excludes any transitional 
substance or mixture which is in a manufactured produa other than a con­
tainer used for the transportation or storage of that substance.
C. Article 2, paragraph 5
Paragraph 5 o f Article 2 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by the following para­
graph:
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5. Any Party may, for any one or more control periods, transfer to another Party 
any portion of its calailated level o f production set out in Arndes 2A to 2E, 
provided that the total combined calculated le/els of production of the Parnes 
concerned for any group of controlled substances do not exceed the production 
limits set out in those Artides for that group. Such transfer of producnon shall 
be notified to the Secretariat by each o f the Parties concerned, stating the terms 
of such transfer and the period for which it is to apply.
D. Anide 2, ратадтарк 6
The following words shall be insened in paragraph 6 of Artide 2 before the words 
'"controlled substances" the first time they occur:
Annex A  or Annex 3
E. ATdcle 2. paragraph 3(a)
The following words shall be added after the words "this Artide" wherever they 
appear in paragraph 8(a) o f Artide 2 of the Protocol: 
and Axtides 2A to 2E
F. Arnde 2, paragraph 9(a)(i)
The following words shall be added after "Annex A " in paragraph 9(a) (i) of Ar­
tide 2 of the Protocol: 
and/or Annex 3
G. Artide 2, paragraph 9 (a)(ii)
The following words shall be deleted from paragraph 9(a) (ii) of Artide 2 of the 
Protocol: 
from 1986 levels
H. Anide 2, paragraph 9(c)
The following words shall be deleted from paragraph 9(c) of Artide 2 of the Pro­
tocol:
representing at least fifty per cent o f the total consumption of the controlled 
substances o f the Parties 
and replaced by:
representing a majority o f the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Artide 5 
present and voting and a majority o f the Parties not so operating present and 
voting
L Anide 2, paragraph 10(b)
Paragraph 10(b) o f Artide 2 o f the Protocol shall be deleted, and paragraph 10(a) 
of Artide 2 shall become paragraph 10.
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The following words shall be added after the words ''this Aiticie" wherever ± e y  
occur in paragraph 11 o f Article 2 o f the Protocol: 
and Artides 2 A  to 2E
iC Article 2C. Other Fully Halogenated CFG 
The following paragraphs shall be added to the Protocol as Artide 2C:
Article 2C, Other Fully Habgenated CFG
1. Each Party shaE enstire chat for the twelve-month period commencing on 
I January 1993, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex В does not 
ercceed, annually, eighn^ per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1989. 
Each Рапу producing one or more of these substances shah, for the same peri­
ods, ensure that its calcalated levd of producrion of the substances does not 
exceed, annually, eighty per cent o f its calculated level of prcducnon in 1989. 
Howc/er, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 o f Artide 5, its calcalated level of producrion may exceed 
that linut by up to ten per cent of its calculated level of producticn in 1989.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1997, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of die controlled substances in Group I of Annex 3 does not 
exceed, annually, fifteen per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 1989. 
Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for the same peri­
ods, ensure that its calculated level o f production of the substances does not 
exceed, annually, fifteen per cent o f its calcalaied level of production in 1989. 
However, in order to satisiy the basic domestic needs of ± e  Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 o f Artide 5, its caicaiaced Ic/el of producrion may exceed 
that limit by up to ten per cent o f its calculated level o f producrion in 1989.
3. Each Party shaü ensure that for ± e  twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 2000, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of the controlled substances in Group I of Annex В does not 
exceed zero. Each Party producing one or more of these substances shall, for 
the same periods, ensure that its calculated level of producrion of the substances 
does not exceed zero. However, in order to satisiy the basic domestic needs of 
the Parries operating under paragraph 1 of Arride 5, its calculated level of pro­
ducrion may exceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level of 
producrion in 1989.
I .  Article 2D. Carbon Tetrachloride
The following paragraphs shall be added to the Protocol as Arride 2D:
J. Article 2, paragraph 11
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1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1995, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption o f the controlled substance in Group n of Annex B does not 
exceed, annually, fifteen per cent of its calculated level o f consumption in 1989. 
Each Party producing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its 
calculated level o f production of the substance does not exceed, annually, 
fifteen per cent o f its calculated level of production in 1989. However, in order 
to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Panies operating under paragraph 1 of 
Article 5, its calculated level o f production may exceed that limit by up to ten 
per cent o f its calculated level of production in 1989.
2. Each Parry shall ensure that for the twelve-mon± period commencing on 
1 January 2000, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
o f consumption of the controlled substance in Group II o f Annex B does not 
exceed zero. Each Party producing the substance shall, for ± e  same periods, 
ensure that its calculated level o f production of the substance does not exceed 
zero. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties oper­
ating under paragraph 1 o f Arride 5, its calculated level o f production may ex­
ceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated Ic/el of producrion in 
1989.
M. Article2E. ULl-Tnchloroeihane (Methyl Chloroform)
The following paragraphs shall be added to the Protocol as Artide 2E;
Article 2E. 1,1,1-Tnchloroethane (Methyl Chloroform)
1. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1993, and in each rweive-month period thereafter, its calculated le^ /el 
o f consumption o f the controlled substance in Group m  of Annex B does not 
exceed, annually, its calculated level of consumption in 1989. Each Parry pro­
ducing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its calculated level 
o f production of the substance does not exceed, annually, its calculated Ic/el of 
production in 1989. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the 
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Artide 5, its calculated Ic/el o f produc­
tion may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent of its calculated Ic/ei o f produc­
tion in 1989.
2. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 1995, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated Ic/el 
o f consumption o f the controlled substance in Group m  of Annex B does net 
exceed, annually, seventy per cent of its calculated level of consumption in 
1989. Each Party producing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure 
that its calculated level o f production of the substance does not exceed, an-
Article 2D. Carbon Tetrachloride
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nually, seventy per cent o f its calculated le/el o f consumption in 1989. How- 
e'/er, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties operating under 
paragraph 1 o f Article 5, its calculated level of production may exceed that lim it 
by up to ten per cent o f its calculated level o f production in 1989.
3. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 2000, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substance in Group m  of Annex B does not 
exceed, annually, thirty per cent o f its calculated level of consumption in 1989. 
Each Party producing the substance shall, for the same periods, ensure that its 
calculated level o f production of the substance does not exceed, annually, thirty 
per cent o f its caloilated level o f production in 1989. However, in order to sat­
isfy the basic domestic needs of Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Arricie 
5, its calculated le^ /el o f production may exceed that limit by up to ten per cent 
of its calculated level o f production in 1989.
4. Each Party shall ensure that for the twelve-month period commencing on 
1 January 2005, and in each twelve-month period thereafter, its calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substance in Group m  of Annex 3 does not 
exceed zero. Each Party producing the substance shall, for ± e  same periods, 
ensure that its calculated level o f production of the substance does not exceed 
zero. However, in order to satisfy the basic domestic needs of the Parties oper­
ating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5, its calculated level of production may ex­
ceed that limit by up to fifteen per cent of its calculated level of production in 
1989.
5. The Parties shall review, in 1992, the feasibility o f a more rapid schedule of 
reductions than that set out in this Article.
N. Article 3. Calculation of Control Levels
1. .The following shall be added after 'Articles 2" in Article 3 of the Protocol:
, 2A to 2E,
2. The following words shall be added after 'Annex A " each time it appears in 
Article 3 o f the Protocol:
or Annex B
0. Article 4. Control o f Trade with Non-Parties
1. Paragraphs 1 to 5 of Article 4 shall be replaced by ± e  following paragraphs:
1. As o f 1 January 1990, each Party shall ban the import of the controlled 
substances in Annex A from any State not party to this Protocol.
1 bis. Within one year o f the date'of the entry into force of this paragraph, 
each Party shall ban the import o f the controlled substances in Annex B from 
any State not party to this Protocol.
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2. As o f 1 January 1993, each Party shall ban the export o f any controlled 
substances in Annex A  to any State not party to this Protocol.
2 bis. Commencing one year after the date o f entry into force of this para­
graph, each Party shall ban the expon of any controlled substances in Anne:: B 
to any State not party to this Protocol.
3. By 1 January 1992, the Parties shall, following the procedures in Artide 10 
o f the Convention, elaborate in an annex a list of products containing con­
trolled substances in Annex A. Parties that have not objected to the anne:c in 
accordance with those procedures shall ban, within one year of the annex hav­
ing become effective, the impon of those products from any State not party to 
this Protocol.
3 bis. Within three years o f the date of the entry into force of this paragraph,
. the Parties shall, following the procedures in Artide 10 of the Convention, elab­
orate in an annex a list o f products containing controlled substances in Annex 
B. Parties that have not objeaed to the annex in accordance with ±ose proce­
dures shall ban, within one year of the annex having become effecnve, the im­
pon of those products from any State not party to this Protocol.
4. By 1 January 1994, the Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or 
restricting, from States not parry to this Protocol, the import of products pro­
duced with, but not containing, controlled substances in Annex A. If deter­
mined feasible, the Parties shall, following the procedures in Artide 10 of the 
Convention, elaborate in an armex a list of such products. Parties that have not 
objeaed to the armex in accordance with those procedures shall ban. within 
one year o f the armex having become effective, the impon o f those producs 
from any State not party to this Protocol.
4 bis. Within five years o f the date of the entry into force o f this paragraph, 
the Parties shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting, from States 
not party to this Protocol, the impon of products produced with, but not con­
taining, controlled substances in Armex B. If determined feasible, the Parties 
shall, following the procedures in Artide 10 of the Convention, elaborate in an 
arme:: a list o f such products. Parties that have not objeaed to the aimex in 
accordance with those procedures shall ban or resnia, within one year of the 
aimex having become effective, the impon of those products from any State not 
party to this Protocol.
5. Each Parry undertakes to the fullest practicable extent to discourage the 
expon to any State not party to this Protocol of technology for producing and 
for utilizing controlled substances.
2. Paragraph 8 o f Artide 4 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by the following 
paragraph:
8. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Artide, imports referred to in para­
graphs I, I bis, 3,3 bis, 4 and 4 bis, and e-xports referred to in paragraphs 2 and 
2 bis, may be permitted from, or to, any State not parry to this Protocol, if that
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State is determined by a meeting of the Parties to be in fuJl compliance with 
Aiticie 2, Articles 2A to 2E. and this Article and have submitted data to that 
cffea as specified in Article 7.
3. The fo llo w in g  paragraph shall be added to Article 4 o f the Protocol as para­
graph 9:
9. For the purposes o f this Article, the term "State not party to this Protocol" 
shall include, with respect to a particular controlled substance, a State or re­
gional economic integration organization that has not agreed to be bound by 
the control measures in efiec: for that substance.
R Article 5. Special Situation of Developing Countries
Article 5 o f the. Protocol shall be replaced by the following:
1. Any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level 
of consumption o f the controlled substances in Annex A  is less than 0.3 kilo­
grams per capita on the date o f the entry into force o f the Protocol for it, or any 
time thereafter until 1 January 1999, shall, in order to meet its basic domestic 
heeds, be entitled to delay for ten years its compliance with the control mea­
sures set out in Articles 2 A  to 2E.
2. However, any Parr/ operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall ex­
ceed neither an annual calculated level of consumption of the controlled sub­
stances in Annex A  o f 0.3 kilograms per capita nor an annual calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances of Annex B of 0.2 kilograms per 
capita.
3. When implementing the control measures set out in Articles 2A  to 2E, any 
Party operating under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be entitled to use:
(a) For controlled substances under Annex A, either the average of its an­
nual calculated level o f consumption for the period L995 to 1997 in­
clusive or a calculated level of consumption o f 0.3 kilograms per capita, 
whichever is the lower, as the basis for determining its compliance ^ vith 
the control measures;
(b) For controlled substances under Annex B, the average of its annual 
calcolated level o f consumption for ± e  period 1998 to 2000 inclusive 
or a calculated level of consumption of 0.2 kiiograms per capita, 
whichever is ± e  lower, as the basis for determining its compliance with 
the control measures.
4. If a Party operating under paragraph 1 of this .Article, at any time before the 
control measures obligations in Articles 2A to 2E become applicable to it, finds 
itself unable to obtain an adequate supply o f controlled substances, it may no­
tify this to the SecretariaL The Secretariat shall forthwith transmit a copy of 
such notification to the Parties, which shall consider the matter at their ne.xt 
Meeting, and decide upon appropriate action to be taken.
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5. Developing the capaaty to fuLBil the obligations of the Parties operating 
under paragraph 1 o f this Arricie to comply with the control measures set out in 
Articles 2A to 2E and their implementation by those same Parties will depend 
upon the effective implementation of the financial co-operation as provided by 
Artide 10 and transfer o f technology as provided by Artide lOA.
6. Any Party operating under paragraph 1 o f this Artide may, at any time, 
notify the Secretariat in writing that, having taken all practicable steps, it is 
unable to implement any or all of the obligations laid down in Artides 2A to 2E 
due to the inadequate implementation of Artides 10 and lOA. The Secretariat 
shall forthwith transmit a copy of the notification to the Parties, which shall 
consider the matter at their nest xMeeting, giving due recognition to paragraph 
5 of this Ainde, and shall dedde upon appropriate action to be taken.
7. During the period between notification and the Meeting of the Parties at 
which the appropriate action referred to in paragraph 6 above is to be deeded, 
or for a further period if the Meeting of the Parties so deddes, the non- 
compliance procedures referred to in Artide & shall not be invoked against the 
notifying Party.
8. A  Meeting of the Parties shall review, not later than 1995, the situation of 
the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of this Artide, induding the effective 
implementation of finançai co-operation and transfer o f technology to them, 
and adopt such re'/isions as may be deemed necessary regarding the schedule 
of control measures applicable to those Parties.
9. Decisions of the Parties referred to in paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 of this Aitide 
shall be taken according to the same procedure applied to dedsion-making 
imder Artide 10.
Q. Article 6, Assezsinait and RrAew o f Control Measures
The following words shall be added after "Artide 2" in Artide 6 o f the Protocol: 
Artides 2A to 2E, and the situation regarding production, imports and e-xports 
o f the transitional substances in Grouo I of Anne.x C
IL Arricle 7. Reporting of Data
1. Artide 7 of the Protocol shall be replaced by ± e  following:
1. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat, within three months of becom­
ing a Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the 
controlled substances in Annex A  for the year 1986, or the best possible esti­
mates o f such data where acmal data are not available.
2. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on its production, 
imports and exports o f each of the controlled substances in Annex B and each
n o
of the transitional substances in Group I o f Annex C, for the year 1989, or the 
best possible estimates of such data where actual data are not available, not later 
than three months after the date when the provisions set out in the Protocol 
with regard to the substances in Annex B enter into force for that Party.
3. Each Party shall provide statistical data to the Secretariat on its annual pro­
duction (as defined in paragraph 5 of Article 1) and, separately,
amounts used for feedstocks,
amounts destroyed by technologies approved by the Parties, 
imports and exports to Parties and non-Parties respectively,
o f each o f the controlled substances listed in Annexes A  and B as well as of the 
transitional substances in Group I of Annex C, for the year during which provi­
sions concerning the substances in Annex B entered into force for that Party 
and for each year thereafter. Data shall be forwarded not later than nine months 
after the end of the year to which the data relate.
4. For Parties operating under the provisions of paragraph 3(a) o f Article 2, 
the requirements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 o f this Article in respea o f statistical 
data on imports and exports shall be satisfied if the regional economic integra­
tion organization concerned provides data on imports and exports between the 
organization and States that are not members of that organization.
S. Article 9. Research, Development, Public Awareness and Exchange of Information
Paragraph 1 (a) o f Article 9 of the Protocol shall be replaced by the fo llow in g :
(a) Best technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling, or 
destruction of controlled and transitional substances or otherAtise reducing 
their emissions;
T Article 10, Financial Mechanism 
Article 10 o f the Protocol shall be replaced by the following:
Article 10. Financial Mechanism
1. The Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes o f providing fi­
nancial and technical co-operation, including the transfer of technologies, to 
Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5 o f this Protocol to enable tiieir 
compliance with the control measures set out in Articles 2A to 2E o f the Proto­
col. The mechanism, contributions to which shall be additional to other finan­
cial transfers to Parties operating under that paragraph, shall meet all agreed 
incremental costs o f such Parties in order to enable their compliance with the 
control measures o f the Protocol. An indicative list o f the categories of incre­
mental costs shall be decided by the Meeting o f the Parties.
I l l
( i i )
( ü i )
(iv)
2. The mechanism established under paragraph 1 shall include a Multilateral 
Fund. It may also include other means of multilateral, regional and bilateral co­
operation.
3. The Multilateral Fund shall:
(a) Meet, on a grant or concessional basis as appropriate, and according to 
criteria to be decided upon by the Parties, the agreed incremental costs;
(b) Finance clearing-house functions to:
(i) .Assist Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, through 
country specific studies and other technical co-operation, to iden­
tify’ their needs for co-operation;
Facilitate technical co-operation to meet these identified needs; 
Distribute, as provided for in Article 9, information and relevant 
materials, and hold workshops, training sessions, and other re­
lated activities, for the benefit of Parties that are developing coun­
tries; and
Facilitate and monitor other multilateral, regional and bilateral 
co-operation available to Parties ±a t are developing countries;
(c) Finance the secretarial services of the Multilateral Fund and related 
suppon costs.
4. The Multilateral Fund shall operate under the authority of the Parties who 
shall decide on its overall polices.
5. The Parties shall establish an Executive Committee to develop and monitor 
the implementation o f specific operational policies, guidelines and administra­
tive arrangements, including the disbursement of resources, for the purpose of 
achieving the objectives of the Multilateral Fund. The Executive Comminee 
shall discharge its tasks and responsibilities, specified in its terms of reference as 
agreed by the Parties, with the co-operation and assistance of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the United Nations 
Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme or 
other appropriate agendes depending on their respective areas of expertise. The 
members o f the Executive Comminee, which shall be selected on the basis o f a 
balanced representation of ± e  Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Artide 5 
and o f the Parties not so operating, shall be endorsed by ± e  Parties.
6. The Multilateral Fund shall be financed by contributions from Parties not 
operating under paragraph 1 o f Artide 5 in convertible currency or, in certain 
circumstances, in kind and/or in national currenc/, on the basis of the United 
Nations scale o f assessments. Contributions by other Parties shall be encour­
aged. Bilateral and. in particilar cases agreed by a decision of the Parties, re­
gional co-operation may, up to a percentage and consistent with any criteria to 
be specified by decision o f the Parties, be considered as a connibution to the 
Multilateral Fund, provided that such co-operation, as a minimum:
(a) Strictly relates to compliance with the provisions o f this Protocol;
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(b) Provides additional resources; and
(c) Meets agreed incremental costs.
7. The Parties shall decide upon the programme budget o f ± e  Multilateral 
Fund for each fiscal period and upon the percentage of contributions of the 
individual Parries thereto.
8. Resources under the Multilateral Fund shall be disbursed with the concur­
rence of the beneficiary Party.
9. Decisions by the Parries under this Article shall be taken by consensus 
whenever possible. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agree­
ment reached, decisions shah be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
Parries present and voting, representing a majority o f the Parries operating 
under paragraph 1 o f Airicie 5 present and voting and a majority o f the Parties 
not so operating present and voting.
10. The financial mechanism set out in this Arride is without prejudice to any 
future arrangements that may be developed with respea to other environmen­
tal issues.
U. Article 10A. Transfer of Technology
The following Arride shall be added to the Protocol as Arride lOA:
Article 10A, Transfer of Technology
Each Party shall take every pracricable step, consistent with the programmes 
supponed by the finandal mechanism, to ensure:
(a) That the best available, environmentaHy safe substitutes and related tech­
nologies are expediriously transferred to Parries operating under paragraph 
1 o f Arride 5; and ,
(b) That the transfers referred to in subparagraph (a) occur under fair and most 
favourable conditions.
V. Article 11. Meetings of the Parties
Paragraph 4(g) o f Arride 11 o f the Protocol shafi be replaced by the following:
(g) Assess, in accordance with Arride 6, the control measures and the situation 
regarding transitional substances;
W. Article 17. Parties Joining after Entry into Force
The following words shall be added after "as well as under" in Arride 17:
Arrides 2A to 2E, and
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X. Article 19, Withdrawal
Artide 19 o f t ie  Protocol shall be replaced by the following paragraph:
Any Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving wrinen notification to the 
Depositary at any time after four years o f assuming the obligations specified in 
paragraph 1 o f Artide 2A. Any such withdrawal shall take effea upon expir/ of 
one year after the date o f its receipt by the Depositary or on such later date as 
may be specified in the notification of the withdrawal.
Y, Annexes
The following annexes shall be added to the Protocol:
Annex B, Controlled Substances
Group Substance
Ozone-depieting
potential
Group I
CFjCl ŒC 13 1.0
C,FC1, C F C ll l 1.0
CFG 112 1.0
CjFCIy CFC211 1.0
C,F,CI, CFG 212 1.0
C,F,C1, GFG213 1.0
C,F,C1, GFG 214 1.0
C,F,C1, GFG215 1.0
C,F,CI, GFG 216 1.0
CjFjCl GFG 217 1.0
Group n
CCI« carbon tetrachloride 1.1
Group m
CjHjClj* 1,1,1-trichloro- 
ethane (methyl 
chloroform)
0.1
a. This formula does n o t refer to 1 ,1 .2 -trichloroethane.
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Annex C. Transitional Substances
Group I Substance Group I Substance
CHrClj HCFC21 CjHFjClj HCFC 225
CHFjCl HCFC 22 CjHF.Cl HCFC 226
CHjFCl HCFC31 CjH^FCl, HCFC 231
CjHFCl4 HCFC 121 C,H,FjCl4 HCFC 232
cjHFjClj HCFC 122 CjH,FjCl, HCFC 233
CjHFjCl, HCFC 123 C,H,F,C1, HCFC 234
cinp^cf HCFC 124 C,K,F,C1* HCFC 235
CH;Fc:, HCFC 131 CjHjFCl^ HCFC 241
cjn^FjC:, HCFC 132 CjHjX cI, HCFC 242
cjn-FjCr HCFC 133 3^ *1 HCFC 243
cjHjFClj HCFC 141 CjHjF^CI HCFC 244
C;H;F,Ci HCFC 142 CjH^FCl, HCFC 251
C,H,FCI ECFC 151 CjH,F,Cl, HCFC 252
c 'h fc i» HCFC 221 CjH^Fjcf HCFC 253
C,HF,C1, HCFC 222 CjH,FCl, HCFC 261
C,HF,'ci, HCFC 223 C,H,F,ci HCFC 262
ciHF^C!, HCFC 224 CjHjFCl HCFC 271
Article 2. Enùy into Force
1. This Amendment shall enter into force on 1 Januar/ 1992, provided that at 
least uventy instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of the Amend­
ment have been deposited by States or regional economic integration organiza­
tions that are Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer. In the event that this condition has not been fulfilled by that date, 
the .Amendment shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on 
which it has been fulfilled.
2. For the purposes o f paragraph 1, any such instroment deposited by a regional 
economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those de­
posited by member States o f such organization.
3. After the entry into force o f this Amendment as provided under paragraph 1, 
it shall enter into force for any other Party to the Protocol on the ninetieth day 
following the date o f deposit o f its instrument of ratification, acceptance or ap­
proval.
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Annex IV, Appendix 27. Tenm o f Reference o f the Executive Committee
1. The Executive Committee o f the Parties is established to develop and monitor 
the implementation o f specific operational policies, guidelines and administrative 
arrangements including the disbursement of resources, for the purpose of achiev­
ing the objectives o f the Multilateral Fund under the Financial Mechanism.
2. The Executive Committee shall consist of seven Parties from the group of 
Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5 o f the Protocol and seven Parties 
from the group o f Parties not so operating. Each group shall seiea its Executive 
Comminee members. The members of the Executive Committee shall be formally 
endorsed by the Meeting o f the Parties.
3. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall be seleaed from the fourteen Exec­
utive Comminee members. The office of Chairman is subjea to rotation, on an 
annual basis, between the Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Article 5, and 
the Parties not so operating. The group of Parties entitled to the chairmanship 
shall seiea the Chairman from among their members of the Executive Comminee. 
The Vice-Chairman shall be seleaed by the other group from within their number.
4. Decisions by the Executive Comminee shall be taken by consensus whene'/er 
possible. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted and no agreement 
reached, decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Parties present 
and voting, representing a majority of the Parties operating under paragraph 1 of 
Article 5 and a majority o f the Parties not so operating present and voting.
5. The meetings o f the Executive Comminee shall be conduced in those official 
languages of the United Nations required by members of the Executive Commit­
tee. Nevertheless the Executive Committee may agree to conduc its business in 
one of the United Nations official languages.
6. Costs o f Executive Comminee meetings, including travel and subsistence of 
Comminee participants from Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5, 
shall be disbursed from the Multilateral Fund as necessary.
7. The Executive Committee shall ensure that the expertise required to perform 
its functions is available to it
8. The Executive Committee shall meet at least twice a year.
9. The Executive Comminee shall adopt other rules of procedure on a provi­
sional basis and in accordance with paragraphs 1 to S of these terms of reference. 
Such provisional rules o f procedure shall be submitted to the next annual meeting 
of the Parties for endorsemenn This procedure shall also be followed when such 
rules o f procedure are amended.
10. The functions o f the Executive Comminee shall include:
Additional Material
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(a) To develop and monitor the implementation o f specific operational poli­
cies, guidelines and administrative arrangements, including the disburse­
ment o f resources;
(b) To develop the three-year plan and budget for the Multilateral Fund, in­
cluding allocation o f Multilateral Fund resources among the agencies 
identified in paragraph 6 o f decision n/8;
(c) To supervise and guide the administration o f the Multilateral Fund;
(d) To develop the criteria for project eligibility and guidelines for the imple­
mentation o f activities supponed by the Multilateral Fund;
(e) To review regularly the performance reports on the implementation of 
activities supported by the Multilateral Fund;
(f) To monitor and evaluate expenditure incarred under the Multilateral 
Fund;
(g) To consider and, where appropriate, approve coimtry programmes for 
compliance with the Protocol and, in the context o f those country pro­
grammes, assess and, where applicable, approve all projea proposals or 
groups o f projea proposals where ± e  agreed inaemenial costs exceed 
5500,000;
(h) To review any disagreement by a Pair/ operating under paragraph 1 of 
Article 5 with any decision taken with regard to a request for financing 
by that Party o f a projea or projects where the agreed inaemental costs 
are less than $500,000;
(i) To assess annually, whether the contributions through bilateral co­
operation, including particjlar regional cases, comply with the criteria set 
out by the Parties for consideration as part o f the contributions to the 
Multilateral Fund;
(j) To repon annually to the meeting of the Parties on the activities exercised 
under the functions outlined above, and to make recommendations as 
appropriate;
(k) To nominate, for appoinonent by the Executive Direaor of UNEP, the 
Chief Officer o f the Fund Seaetariat, who shall work under tiie Executive 
Comminee and repon to it; and
(l) To perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Meeting 
of the Parties.
Annex IV, Appendix IV, Terms o f Reference fo r the Interim  Multilateral Fund
A, Establishment
1. An interim Multilateral Fund o f $160 million, which could be raised by up to 
$80 million during the three-year period when more countries become Parries to
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the Protocol hereinaiici referred to as "the Multilateral Fund/' shall be estab­
lished.
B. Roles o f the Implementing Agencies
2. Under the overall guidance and supervision of the Executive Committee in 
the discharge of its polic/-making functions;
(a) Implementing agencies shall be requested by the Executive Committee, 
in the context o f country programmes developed to fadliiate compliance 
with the Protocol to co-operate with and assist the Parties within their 
respecdve areas o f expertise; and
(b) Implementing agencies shall be invited by the Executive Comminee to 
develop an inter-agency agreement and spedSc agreements with the Ex­
ecutive Comminee acting on behalf o f the Parties.
Implementing agencies shall apply only those considerations relevant to efecnve 
and economically efBdent programmes and projects which are consistent with 
any criteria adopted by the Parties.
3. Spediically,
(a) The United Nations Environment Programme shall be invited by the Ex­
ecutive Comminee to co-operate and assist in political promotion of the
. objectives o f the Protocol as well as in research, data gathering and ± e  
clearing-house fimcnons;
(b) The United Nations Development Programme and such other agencies 
which, within their areas o f expertise, may be able to assist, shall be in­
vited by the Executive Comminee to co-operate and assist in feasibility 
and pre-investment smdies and in other technical assistance meastires;
(c) The World Bank shall be invited by the Executive Comminee to co­
operate and assist in administering and managing the programme :o fi­
nance the agreed incremental costs;
(d) Other agencies, in particular regional development banks, shall also be 
invited by the Executive Comminee to co-operate with and assist it in 
carrying out its functions.
4. The Executive Comminee shall draw up reporting criteria and shall invite die 
implementing agencies to repon regularly to it in accordance with those criteria.
5. The Executive Comminee shall invite the implementing agencies, in fulfilling 
their responsibilities in respea o f the Multilateral Fund, to consult each other reg­
ularly. It shall also invite the heads o f the agencies, or their representatives, to 
meet at least once a year to report on their activities and consult on co-operative 
arrangements.
6. The implementing agencies shall be entitled to receive support costs for the 
activities they undertake having reached specific agreements with the Executive 
Committee.
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C. Budget and Contribuiions
7. The Multilateral Fund shall be financed in accordance with paragraph 7 of 
decision n/8. In addition, contributions may be made by countries not Party to the 
Protocol, and by other governmental, intergovernmental, non-govemmental and 
other sources.
8. The contributions referred to in paragraph 7 above are to be based on the 
scale o f contributions set out in Appendix m. Bilateral, and in particular cases, 
regional co-operation by a country not operating under paragraph 1 o f Artide 5 
may, according to criteria adopted by the Parties, be considered as a contribution 
to the Multilateral Fund up to a total of twenty per cent of the total contribution 
by that Party set out in AppendLx m.
9. All contributions other than the value of bilateral and agreed regional co­
operation referred to in paragraph 8 above shall be in convertible cuirenc/ or. in 
certain dioimstances, in kind and/or in national currency.
10. Contributions from States that become Parties not operating under paragraph 
1 of Artide 5 after the beginning o f the finandai period of the mechanism shall be 
calculated on a pro rata basis for the balance o f the financal period.
11. Contributions not immediately required for the purposes of the Multilateral 
Fund shall be invested under the authority of the Executive Committee and any 
interest so earned shall be aedited to the Multilateral Fund.
12. Budget estimates, setting out the income and e.xpenditure of the Multilateral 
Fund prepared in United States dollars, shall be drawn up by the Executive Com­
mittee and submitted to the regular meetings of the Parties to the Protocol.
13. The proposed budget estimates shall be dispatched by the Fund Secretariat to 
all Parties to the Protocol at least sixty days before the date fixed for the opening 
of the regular meeting of the Parties to the Protocol at which they are to be consid­
ered.
14. After entry into force o f the Amendment to the Protocol, the Financial Mech­
anism shall be established by the. Parties at their next regular meeting and any 
resources remaining in the interim Multilateral Fund shall be transferred to the 
multilateral fund established under that mechanism.
D. Administration
15. The World Bank shall be invited by the Executive Committee to co-operate 
with and assist it in administering and managing the programme to finance the 
agreed incremental costs o f Parties operating under paragraph 1 o f Artide 5. 
Should the World Bank accept this invitation, in the context o f an agreement Tvith 
the Executive Committee, the President of the World Bank shall be the Adminis­
trator o f this programme, which shall operate under the authority o f the Executive 
Committee.
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16. The Execjtive Commirtee shall encourage the involvement of other agencies, 
in parrioilar the regional deveiopment banks, in carr/ing out its functions effec­
tively in relation to the programme to finance the agreed incremental costs.
17. The Fund Secretariat operating under the Gbdef Officer, co-Iocated Tvith the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNE?) at a place to be decided by the 
Executive Committee, shall assist the Executive Comminee in the discharge of its 
functions. The Muitilaterai Fund shall cover Secretariat costs, based on regular 
budgets to be submitted for decision by the Executive Committee.
IS. In the event that the Chief Officer of the Fund Secretariat anticipates that 
there may be a shortfall in resources over the financial period as a whole, he shall 
have discrenon to adjust the budget approved by the Parties so that expenditures 
are at all times fiiily covered by contributions received.
19. No commitments shall be made in advance of the receipt o f contributions, but 
income not spent in a budget year and unimplemented acriviries may be carried 
forward from one year to the ne.xt within ± e  financial period.
20. A t the end o f each calendar year, the Chief Officer o f the Fund Secretariat 
shall submit to the Parties accounts for the year. The Chief Officer shall also, as 
soon as pracricabie, submit die audited accounts for each period so as to coincide 
with the accounting procedures o f the implementing agencies.
21. The Fund Secretariat and the implementing agencies shall co-operate with 
the Parries to provide information on funding available for relevant projects, to 
secure the necessary contacxs and to co-ordinate, when requested by the inter­
ested Party, projects financed from other sources widi acriviries financed under 
the Protocol.
22. The financing o f acrivicies or other costs, including resources channelled to 
third party beneficiaries, shall require die concurrence of'ffie recipient Govern­
ments concerned. Recipient Governments shall, where appropriate, be associated 
with the planning of projects and programmes.
23. Nothing shall preclude a beneficiary Party operating under paragraph 1 of 
Arride 5 from applying for its requirements for agreed mcrementoi costs solely 
from the resources available to the Multilateral Fund.
A im ci Vn. Resolution by the Governments and the European Communities 
Represented at the Second Meeting o f the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
The Governments and the European Communities represented at the Second
Meeting o f the Parries to the Montreal Protocol
Resolve:
120
L Other Halons Not Listed in Annex A, Group U, o f the Montreal Protocol
C'Other Hahns'")
1. To refrain from authorizing or to prohibit production and consumption o f 
fully halogenated compounds containing one, two or three carbon atoms and at 
least one atom each o f bromine and fluorine,* and not listed in Group n o f Annex 
A  of the Montreal Protocol (hereafter called ''other halons"), which are o f such a 
chemical namre or such a quantity that they would pose a threat to the ozone 
layer;
2. To refrain from using other halons except for those essential applications 
where other more environmentally suitable alternative substances or technologies 
are not yet available; and
3. To report to the Secretariat to the Protocol estimates of their annual produc­
tion and consumption o f such other haions;
ZZ. Transinonal Substances
1. To apply the following guidelines to facilitate the adoption of transitional sub­
stances with a low ozone-depleting potential, such as hydrochiorofluorocarbons 
(HCFCs), where necessary, and their timely substimtion by non-ozone depleting 
and more environmentally suitable alternative substances or technologies:
(a) Use o f transitional substances should be limited to those applications 
where other more environmentally suitable alternative substances or 
technologies are not available;
(b) Use of transitional substances should not be outside the areas o f applica­
tion currently met by the controlled and transitional substances, except 
in rare cases for the protection of human life or human health;
(c) Transitional substances should be selected in a manner that minimizes 
ozone depletion, in addition to meeting other environmental, safety and 
economic considerations;
(d) Emission control systems, recovery and recycling should, to the degree 
possible, be employed in order to minimize emissions to the atmosphere;
(e) Transitional substances should, to the degree possible, be colleaed and 
prudently destroyed at the end of their final use;
2. To review regularly the use o f transitional substances, their contribution to 
ozone depletion and global wanning, and the availability of alternative products 
and application technologies, with a view to their replacement by non-ozone de­
pleting and more environmentally suitable alternatives and as the scientific evi-
121
dence requires^ at present, this should be no later than 2040 and, if possible, no 
later than 2020;
n i. l , U ‘ Tnchioroethane (Methyl Chloroform)
1. To phase out production and consumption of methyl chloroform as soon as 
possible;
2. To request the Technology Re^/iew Panel to investigate the earliest technically 
feasible dates for reductions and total phase-out; and
3. To request the Technology Review Panel to repon their findings to the prepa­
ratory meeting of the Parties with a view to the consideration by the iMeeting of 
the Parties, not later than 1992;
IV. More Stringent Measures
1. To express appredation to those Parties that have already taken measures 
more stringent and broader in scope than those required by the Protocol;
2. To urge adoption, in accordance with the spirit o f paragraph 11 o f *\itide 2 of 
the Protocol, o f such measures in order to protea the ozone layer.
Statement by Heads o f Delegations o f the Governments o f Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic o f Germany, Finland, 
Liechtenstein, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
The heads o f delegations of the above governments represented at the Second 
Meeting o f the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
Concerned about the recent scentific findings on severe deplenon o f the ozone 
layer o f both Southern and Northern Hemispheres;
Mindful that ail CFCs are also powerful greenhouse gases leading to global warm­
ing.
Convinced o f the availability o f more environmentally suitable alternative sub­
stances or technologies, and
Convinced o f the need to further tighten control measures of CPCs beyond the Pro­
tocol adjustments agreed by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol,
DECLARE their Опп determination to take all appropriate measures to phase out 
the production and consumption o f all fully halogenated chiorofluorocarbons 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, as adjusted and amended, as soon as possible 
but not later than 1997.
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